Contenu de l'article

Titre La guerre des ondes entre la France et l'Allemagne pendant la « drôle de guerre »
Auteur Maude Fagot
Mir@bel Revue Revue historique
Numéro no 671, juillet 2014
Rubrique / Thématique
Discours de haine, violences de guerre (2)
Page 629-654
Résumé Alors que les opérations militaires entre la France et l'Allemagne n'ont pas encore pris l'ampleur qu'une déclaration de guerre est connue d'engendrer, un combat d'une autre nature fait rage. La guerre à laquelle se livre les deux pays se joue en effet dans le domaine de l'éther ; à travers les ondes radiophoniques. Les deux nations utilisent ce nouveau medium de masse qu'est la radiodiffusion pour atteindre la population, l'armée ennemie et tentent d'influencer son moral par le biais de mots, de slogans et d'arguments corrosifs. Alors que la supériorité de la propagande allemande est communément acceptée dans l'historiographie des deux pays, il est peu connu – mais n'en demeure pas moins vrai – que les autorités françaises se sont lancées dans cette bataille avec autant d'énergie. Les arguments de l'une et l'autre nations, bien que dissemblables, reposent sur des méthodes identiques de propagande, créant ainsi, dans le domaine de la propagande extérieure, des similitudes inhérentes à la période.
Source : Éditeur (via Cairn.info)
Résumé anglais Radio propaganda in France and in Germany during the phoney war. In French as well as in German and British historiography, German propaganda during the Second World War is generally considered to have been more active and more effective than its French counterpart. This article calls this notion into question by looking at radio propaganda in France and Germany, and re-evaluates the balance between the two. During the inter-war period, radio propaganda became increasingly organised, so that it may even be called ‘centralised' by the time war broke out on 3 September 1939. Centralisation of propaganda leads to complex institutions, where rivalries arise between various services, as all of them are reluctant to cede prerogatives in the domain of information and propaganda to other institutions. However, both nations had established such an institution, i.e. a radio propaganda service to broadcast propaganda targeted at the enemy. In France, the Section germanique and in Germany the Büro Concordia organised radio broadcasts in the enemy's language. Two kinds of programmes – ‘black' and ‘white' – aimed at demoralising the enemy's civilian population and army in various ways. While ‘black programmes' were disguised as national radio, pretending to be part of the broadcasting service of their listeners' country, ‘white programmes' explicitly stated that their information came from the enemy. Thus, both civilians and soldiers in France and Germany would potentially be exposed to enemy propaganda, which was intended to convince them of their future defeat, and hence of the futility of carrying on with the war. The approach the National Socialists took towards the French consisted mainly in virulent and aggressive anti-British propaganda. This campaign aimed at splitting the Franco-British alliance by attempting to lead the former to believe that they had been sent to the battlefield on their own and served British interests. Conversely, French propaganda targeted at Germany was more varied, yet two approaches figure prominently. The first approach taken was based on criticism of the SS, the SA, and Hitler, and called for a revolt of the German population against National Socialism, and Hitler in particular. The second line targeted the agreement Hitler and Stalin had reached in August 1939, by calling Hitler's authority into question. In both countries, France and Germany, radio propaganda was at work, employing the same methods, such as repetitions and slogans, and aimed at weakening the enemy's morale. Finally, there were no signs of particularities that could be attributed to French ‘democracy' or German ‘totalitarianism'.
Source : Éditeur (via Cairn.info)
Article en ligne http://www.cairn.info/article.php?ID_ARTICLE=RHIS_143_0629