| Titre | La théorie des contrats implicites : bilan et perspectives | |
|---|---|---|
| Auteur | Anne Perrot | |
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Revue | Economie et prévision |
| Numéro | no 92-93, 1990/1-2 La formation des salaires : de la "loi du marché" aux stratégies des acteurs | |
| Page | 15-20 | |
| Résumé anglais |
The Implicit Contracts Theory: Results and Prospects,
by Anne Perrot.
By using a simple model, this paper presents the idea behind the implicit contracts theory to explain why wage agreements are so rigid and why involuntary unemployment exists: the hiring process is considered to be an insurance policy whereby firms, either neutral or relatively unexposed to risk, insure wage earners, who are more exposed to risk, against fluctuations in their income. The result is rigidity in wages and perhaps involuntary unemployment. These results are discussed in comparison with other hypotheses on the nature of agreements and constraints on the agents (areas of employment, benefits paid to the unemployed,...). Such agreements can be responsible for cases of over-employment. Source : Éditeur (via Persée) |
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| Article en ligne | http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/ecop_0249-4744_1990_num_92_1_5153 |
