Contenu de l'article

Titre L'attribution des marchés en fonction de l'offre économiquement la plus avantageuse
Auteur Florence Naegelen
Mir@bel Revue Economie et prévision
Numéro no 132-133, 1998/1-2
Rubrique / Thématique
Théorie et applications des mécanismes d'enchères
Page 103-120
Résumé anglais Awarding Contracts According to the Best Bids in Economic Terms by Florence Naegelen This article examines problems arising from the criterion for determining the best bids in tenders where the quality of products can be observed. The optimum procedure is one where bidders can provide all levels of quality and where the quality provided by each bidder is a publicly known exogenous variable. Then we describe tender procedures that make it possible to implement optimum rules and we conclude by assuming that bidders' efforts can influence the cost of supplying quality.
Source : Éditeur (via Persée)
Article en ligne http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/ecop_0249-4744_1998_num_132_1_5903