Contenu du sommaire : 24 février 2022, un an après… (1/2)

Since 24 February 2022 Moscow has been continually wanting to give the impression that Western aid to Ukraine amounts to cobelligerence. There is no legal basis for this, especially since those countries offering arms to Kyiv made quite clear from the outset that there would be no troops committed in support of the country suffering aggression. This aspect of the war nevertheless represents a test of international law.

The Armée de l'air et de l'espace (the French Air and Space Force) reacted very quickly to the war in Ukraine to reinforce NATO's eastern flank. Over the past year the first lessons learned have been taken into account: they highlight the need for agility and capability, and back up the demanding training programme for preparation for tomorrow's conflicts.

The considerable number of armoured vehicles destroyed by the adversary is a demonstration of the intensity of combat and its high attrition rate. Certainly Western aid is essential, but modes of action also make the difference on the ground. The longer the war lasts, the greater will be the need for armour.

The Ukrainian forces have been able to compensate for their numerical inferiority to Russian forces through massive use of innovation and the resources offered by technology. The employment of drones is one example of this, full of lessons to be learned—for Western forces, too.

Strange though it seems, Russia has been late in deploying high-tech assets such as drones and electronic warfare. Cyber war has been and remains and area of confrontation yet without any decisive advantage for Moscow. Conversely, Ukraine has from the outset used all the resources that technology can offer with obvious effectiveness.

The war that Russia has chosen to wage against Ukraine is calling into question every principle of international law despite it being accepted by Moscow. It is therefore essential to defend the international order and to bring to justice those guilty of aggression against a sovereign and independent state.

The war in Ukraine has had a major impact on the Atlantic Alliance, accelerating the process of transformation whilst bringing considerable support to Kyiv. NATO has to continue developing and improving its capabilities for confronting these new threats, and at the same time acknowledge that it needs to identify its weak points.

The resurgence of major conflict in Europe has led to massive commitment of continuous news channels to the events. BFMTV (a French TV news channel) has already despatched nearly a quarter of its journalists to cover the war in Ukraine—at the cost of bloodshed for some—with a permanent requirement to explain the drama provoked by Putin.

Despite the high-intensity warfare, it is still too soon to see a way out of the crisis. There are too many unknowns at this stage, yet one certainty is that Russia is sinking into chaos whilst despite the suffering endured there Ukraine is a model of tenacity and hope for freedom.

Evidence is presented here of the distinctly offensive Russian strategy in cyber space. Moscow has the determination, and is well organised to bypass the current operating rules of the Internet, supported in this quest by stronger relations with China in particular.

Russia is aiming to develop a more far-reaching naval strategy despite Western sanctions and pressure. The Black Sea is already under virtually two-party control by Moscow and Ankara—clear evidence of this Russian thrust. Naval competition is clearly with us and is set to last.

The war against Ukraine waged by Vladimir Putin is in line with an imperialist ambition aimed at re-integrating that recalcitrant country into the post-Soviet sphere of influence. It is also an appalling mess, which is resulting in the long-term isolation of Russia, now hostile to all that comes from a version of the West dreamed up by the Kremlin.

The spirit of defence, once known as patriotism, is the collective desire among citizens to build the cohesion of a nation in the face of continually changing types of risk and threat. It is a permanent commitment—one that is not always tractable, but more than ever necessary and essential.

The conflict that Russia has forced upon Ukraine does not attract the approval of former Soviet republics in Central Asia. Quite the contrary: they have been distancing themselves from Moscow, whilst at the same time China is consolidating its influence, profiting from its economic power and its current investments.

The WEU, created in 1948 to face the Soviet threat and rapidly supplanted by NATO, recovered a little in the 1990s before fading again as the Atlantic Alliance was extended to the East and the EU increased its responsibilities regarding external relations. Together, these factors led to the dissolution of the WEU in 2010.

The French First Army, the 1re Armée, played a major role in French strategic doctrine up to the fall of the Berlin Wall. It was the NATO reserve in case of Soviet aggression, and also part of the national deterrent.

Brazil is acknowleged as a regional power, yet after the turbulent change of President is now at a crossroads: it needs to consolidate its democratic system and review how its wealth is shared. A further challenge is to establish a more balanced foreign policy in an unbalanced world.