| Titre | Pouvoir et négociations dans la décision d'investissement | |
|---|---|---|
| Auteur | Maurice Nussenbaum | |
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Revue | Revue économique |
| Numéro | vol. 26, no. 1, 1975 | |
| Page | 66-90 | |
| Résumé |
A model of the capital investment decision process
Capital budgeting and décision theory are criticized by behavioral scientists on the basis of their behavioral hypotheses. We have built an analytical model of the capital investment decisions process (which can also be used for other non repetitive decisions). This model is used hère to investigate the effects of various changes in behavioral variables. It outlines their advantage of viewing the organization as a bargaining system. Not only the final decision, but also the décision set is the résultant of negotiations between organizational units. This approach enables one to relax one of the traditional hypotheses of capital budgeting, perfect knowledge of all the alternatives. Source : Éditeur (via Persée) |
|
| Résumé anglais |
A model of the capital investment decision process
Capital budgeting and décision theory are criticized by behavioral scientists on the basis of their behavioral hypotheses. We have built an analytical model of the capital investment decisions process (which can also be used for other non repetitive decisions). This model is used hère to investigate the effects of various changes in behavioral variables. It outlines their advantage of viewing the organization as a bargaining system. Not only the final decision, but also the décision set is the résultant of negotiations between organizational units. This approach enables one to relax one of the traditional hypotheses of capital budgeting, perfect knowledge of all the alternatives. Source : Éditeur (via Persée) |
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| Article en ligne | http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/reco_0035-2764_1975_num_26_1_408193 |
