| Titre | Dix ans de coopération économique entre le Vietnam et l'Europe de l'Est | |
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| Auteur | François Guilbert | |
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Revue | Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest |
| Numéro | Vol. 19, 4, 1988 | |
| Page | 117-144 | |
| Résumé |
Après la fin de la seconde guerre du Vietnam, Hanoi continue à définir sa politique étrangère autour du concept d'« indépendance ». Au sein du camp socialiste, la République Socialiste du Vietnam (R.S.V.) cherche à maintenir son équidistance entre les deux « grands frères » chinois et soviétique. Durant l'été 1978, tout va basculer d'un seul coup et la R.S.V. devient le véritable allié de l'U.R.S.S. en Asie du Sud-Est.
En signant un traité d'amitié et de coopération avec l'U.R.S.S. à Moscou, le 2 novembre 1978, Hanoi modifiait profondément l'orientation de sa politique extérieure. La première conséquence, quelques mois après, fut l'intervention des troupes de Pékin au Nord du Vietnam, opérations consécutives à l'intervention vietnamienne au Kampuchea. Source : Éditeur (via Persée) |
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| Résumé anglais |
Ten years of co-operation between Vietnam and Eastern Europe.
After the end of the second Vietnam war, Hanoi continued to define its foreign policy according to the concept of « independence ». Within the socialist camp, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (S.R.V.) sought to hold the middle ground between its two « big brothers », Chinese and Russian. During the summer of 1978, everything changed at a stroke, and the S.R.V. became the genuine ally of the U.S.S.R. in S.E. Asia.
Hanoi, by signing a treaty of friendship and co-operation with the U.S.S.R. in Moscow on the 2nd November, 1978, radically changed the direction of its foreign policy. The first consequence, several months later, was the intervention in North Vietnam of Peking's troops, an operation following on the Vietnamese intervention in Kampuchea.
Once more, in this context, the attention of foreign observers focused on the military relations between Hanoi and Moscow. In stressing the advantages which the U.S.S.R. stands to gain from the crisis with People's China, in terms of naval and air facilities at Cam Ranh, Danang, and even in Kampuchea, observers are apt to lose sight of other aspects of these bilateral relations. In fact, the military accords are complemented by a whole range of economic aid, trade and co-operation. At the same time as this treaty was signed, there were five other agreements, providing for economic, technical, scientific and cultural assistance over the next ten years.
It is time now to reassess the situation, particularly since June 1988 was also the tenth anniversary of Vietnam joining Comecon. The basic philosophy underlying Comecon is the encouragement of economic planning and integration through trade ; how should the « tasks » be apportioned among the various constituent members in order to assist Vietnam to emerge from its profound economic under-development ? The economy of Vietnam, damaged by over thirty years of war, can only respond in a limited number of ways to a socialist division of labour. In order to analyse the effectiveness of these attemps, a destription of the various sectors of Vietnam external trade with various Eastern European countries was undertaken. In the knowledge that membership of Comecon was not voted unanimously, and was only effected by Soviet pressure, it was important to have a geographical analysis of Vietnamese foreign trade in order to check though time whether a greater equalization of contributions was operating among the countries of Eastern Europe.
The trade deficit, Vietnamese indebtedness, and the malfunctioning of most of the jointly-financed projects, are beginning to worry the Kremlin, particularly since its special relationship with Hanoi represents a certain drawback vis-à-vis the other states in the region. Moscow, which is seeking to improve its image and increase its influence in Pacific Asia, finds that the bill for economic co-operation is particularly steep given its poor results in the developement of the R.S.V. In 1987, the U.S.S.R. had to spend almost 2 billions dollars in economic aid to Vietnam, and almost as much in military aid.
To redress the balance in respect of the inflationary process, a relatively little known phenomenon seems to have been developing since the 1980's, that is to say the export of Vietnamese labour to Eastern Europe. If there is profound disagreement between Moscow and Hanoi on a certain number of issues, such as relations with China, and the cost of economic aid, their common interests are still, and probably will remain for a long time to come, despite the prickly nature of Vietnamese nationalism, too numerous to place the developments of these last ten years in question. Source : Éditeur (via Persée) |
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| Article en ligne | http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/receo_0338-0599_1988_num_19_4_1386 |
