| Titre | Un troisième concept de liberté au-delà d'Isaiah Berlin et du libéralisme anglais | |
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| Auteur | Quentin Skinner | |
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Revue | Actuel Marx |
| Numéro | no 32, septembre 2002 Les libéralismes | |
| Page | 15-49 | |
| Résumé anglais |
Isaiah Berlin, English Liberalism and a Third Concept of Liberty. Isaiah Berlin is celebrated for having defended the claim that there are two distinct concepts of liberty. According to the more familiar view, liberty is a « negative » concept. The presence of liberty is said to be marked, that is, by the absence of something, and specifically by the absence of inteference with an agent's capacity to pursue some chosen end. According to Berlin, however, this concept stands in contrast with a « positive » view, according to which liberty is the name of that state in which we shall have realised ourselves most completely. Liberty on this account is the name not of an opportunity but of a moral achievement. Berlin considered the second view dangerously confused, but one aim of the present essay is to defend its coherence. Its principal aim, however, is to show that Berlin's understanding of negative liberty is a misleadingly narrow one. As is evident from classical and early-modern debates, we have in fact inherited two rival conceptions of negative liberty. One of these focuses, as Berlin rightly observed, on the idea of absence of interference. But the other, which he overlooked, sees lack of liberty as arising from relations of domination and dependence. The principal aim of the present essay is to distinguish these two traditions and to give new prominence to the idea of negative liberty as absence not of interference but of dependence. Source : Éditeur (via Cairn.info) |
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| Article en ligne | http://www.cairn.info/article.php?ID_ARTICLE=AMX_032_0015 |
