| Titre | Who is (not) afraid of (cultural) relativism ? | |
|---|---|---|
 |
Revue | Tracés |
| Numéro | no 12, 2007/1 Faut-il avoir peur du relativisme ? | |
| Rubrique / Thématique | Articles |
|
| Page | 60 | |
| Résumé |
I examine the thesis of "cultural relativism" (in both its descriptive and normative version) in an effort to ascertain and impeach more perspicuously the reasons for the strong appeal it continues to exert today in a globalizing/glocalising world ?and this, despite the fact that it has been shown repeatedly to be inconsistent, self-defeating and misguided. Because of its highly objectionable and deeply troublesome consequences, especially from an ethical and political point of view, it should be clear to anyone who cares to make such an assessment that we have good reasons for fearing relativism, and that such a fear (both as an emotional and intellectual response) is furthermore not only warranted but reasonable. My answer to the normative question of whether we should be afraid follows obviously from that. However, I believe that we stand to advance the debate further and thereby gain in our understanding of the issue by addressing the following question: ?Who is (not) afraid of (cultural) relativism?? Taking my lead from Williams' insightful analysis and recommendation, I argue essentially that though cultural relativism conjures up a general moral problem, it is in reality either too early or too late, and in our case, at this juncture of history, it is rather late. Only a movement away from cultural relativism and towards something like a ?pluralistic, historically enlightened ethical universalism? can help us address the moral questions that we all face together in a globalizing/ glocalising world, and in which we now form a new moral and conversational community confronted with urgent problems and new challenges. For this purpose, I consider two possibly viable options, those of Williams and Nussbaum. After showing briefly why Williams' case against ethical theory is far from being convincing or conclusive, and why his proposal of ?reflection' as an alternative is ultimately inadequate, I turn to Nussbaum's bold, substantial, and timely proposal in an effort to ascertain whether it is ultimately a viable and defensible one. I conclude that, though still fraught with various problems and difficulties, it is nevertheless compelling and commendable ?despite her critics' claims to the contrary. In closing, I distinguish several ways to ?justify? ?ethical universalism' and consider at least two variants of ?pluralism' in an effort to show further some of the real philosophical problems and difficulties confronting Nussbaum's proposal, and more generally, the fundamental challenge we face today.
Keywords : cultural relativism, fundamentalism, moral cosmopolitanism, fear, diversity, uniformity, globalization, glocalisation complexity, tolerance, pluralism, historical enlightenment, ethical universalism Source : Éditeur (via Cairn.info) |
|
| Article en ligne | http://traces.revues.org/401 |
