| Titre | Open innovation and co-operation: which choice of means of protection for innovation? | |
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| Auteur | Delphine Gallaud, Maximilien Nayaradou | |
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Revue | Journal of Innovation Economics |
| Numéro | no 10, 2012 Global R&D and Open Innovation Systems | |
| Page | 167-190 | |
| Résumé anglais |
Chesbrough's (2003) open innovation model incites firms to use more and more external sources to improve their innovation process. However, how can firms benefit from their investments in knowledge in such cases of collective invention? Chesbrough's innovation model deals very little with this issue, especially in the case of co-operation for innovation. Chesbrough's model on openness leans on case studies of large firms. However, at the moment, scholars have hardly studied the hypothesis of the model on a quantitative basis.The study explores intellectual property strategies of French industrial firms to test the hypothesis of Chesbrough's model on a quantitatively basis. We use the data of the community innovation survey (CIS3) for the period 1998-2000. The survey concerns all French firms of more of 20 employees. Then we use a logit model. One main result can be observed: firms do not use the open innovation model strategy. That is to say they do not use less means of protection when they co-operate. On the contrary, they use more means of protection in this case. Moreover, the model predicts that firms would use less secrecy as a means of protection. We obtain the opposite result. Secrecy is correlated with 3 different kinds of partners of co-operation. In addition, firms use various means of protection in a complementary way. This point reduces the predictions of the open innovation model. JEL Codes: O31, O34, L60 Source : Éditeur (via Cairn.info) |
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| Article en ligne | http://www.cairn.info/article.php?ID_ARTICLE=JIE_010_0167 |
