| Titre | The impact of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact on the course of Soviet foreign policy | |
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| Auteur | Gabriel Gorodetsky | |
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Revue |
Cahiers du monde russe Titre à cette date : Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique |
| Numéro | volume 31, no 1, janvier-mars 1990 | |
| Rubrique / Thématique | Articles |
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| Page | 27-41 | |
| Résumé anglais |
Gabriel Gorodetsky, The impact of the Ribbenirop-Molotov pact on the course of Soviet foreign policy.
The author challenges the current historiography which tends to assume that in signing the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact Stalin, motivated by greed for territories, had thrown his lot with Germany. An examination of Allied archives and Soviet sources reveals Stalin's foreign policy to be unscrupulously realpolitik, dominated by a realization of the Soviet Union's relative weakness. The pact, however, was not regarded as a foolproof guarantee for Russia's western borders in view of Stalin's deep-seated suspicion of a British-German reconciliation. Thus rather than commitment to Germany and a division of Europe to spheres of influence Stalin regarded strict neutrality as the crowning success of their diplomacy. Such neutrality, however, remained precarious throughout the interregnum of 1939-1941 . It was sapped by the Soviet benign attitude to Germany, by contemplated Allied action against Russia, and by the profound gnawing fear in the Kremlin of a British connivance in a future war with Germany. Consequentially, especially after the fall of France, Stalin was forced to resort to such exceedingly subtle dual diplomacy that its meaning was often lost on his partners. His obsessive suspicion of a separate peace hampered his judgment and contributed to the paralysis which struck him as war drew nearer. Source : Éditeur (via Persée) |
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| Article en ligne | http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/cmr_0008-0160_1990_num_31_1_2200 |
