| Titre | «Les réactions structurelles des grandes économies à la crise» | |
|---|---|---|
| Auteur | Hugues Bertrand, Yves Barou | |
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Revue |
Economie et prévision Titre à cette date : Statistiques et études financières (Série orange) |
| Numéro | no 44, 1980/4 | |
| Page | 51-64 | |
| Résumé anglais |
Structural reactions of the major economies to the
crisis
by Yves Barou and Hugues Bertrand.
The object of this article is to try to draw up an initial balance sheet of the information we have at the present time on this vast subject. First it is advisable to emphasize the fact that in spite of the importance traditionally attributed to the first oil shock, in 1973, the nineteen-seventies possess a unity which may be characterized in two ways : on the one hand, the initial difficulties (investment, growth, income distribution, productivity) preceded the oil shock, France being an apparent exception , on the other hand, the preceding «structural» (sectoral) evolutions, far from being transformed or reversed from 1973 on, were on the contrary maintained and amplified. Thus analyzed, the oil shock does not give rise to a new process : it accelerates the preceding structural evolutions, some of them obvious, and others still veiled In particular, we find many similarities between France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan, which contrast with what we find in the USA or the U K It is remarkable that the evolution of the apparent productivity of labor in the medium run seems to be independent of economic policies adopted in the short run. It is as though it were due to long-run structural factors having no narrow relationship with provisions made or the economic behaviors that were observed (more or less rapid adjustment of employment, curbing of remunerations, etc ). Likewise, in most countries, industrial activities went through a very : difficult period, under the pressure of wage claims which were still high and an often strong contraction of outlets. The difference in intensity of this constraint depending upon the country scarcely appears to have affected medium— term evolution, as if, once again, the medium-term «laws» had more weight than elaborate short-term policies.
Though it is relatively easy to designate the macro-sectors which are most seriously affected by the difficulties of the period in this or that country, on the other hand it seems difficult, at that level of observation, to detect the appearance of new motive sectors bearing the seeds of possible later growth, either because there are none or because they cannot be observed at that rough level of macroeconomic observation.
In this general context France's economy appears to occupy a somewhat traditional median position, from a twofold standpoint on the one hand, it has not known abrupt, ample movements as have the USA, Japan or the U K . but rather a gentle evolution , on the other hand, it remains in an intermediate situation with respect to it chief partners, marked however by a closer kinship with the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan. The relative resistance in 1974-1978 to the crisis and to the threat of recession, however, cannot fail to remain worrisome for what is to follow, because of a general lack of dynamism, the most obvious feature of which is the marked and lasting weakening of the investment rate. Source : Éditeur (via Persée) |
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| Article en ligne | http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/ecop_0338-4217_1980_num_44_1_6033 |
