| Titre | Une exploration des procédures d'appels d'offres portant sur des combinaisons prix-qualité | |
|---|---|---|
| Auteur | Patrick Rey, Michel Norotte, Dominique Bureau | |
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Revue | Economie et prévision |
| Numéro | no 85, 1988/4 | |
| Rubrique / Thématique | Une exploration des procédures d'appels d'offres portant sur des combinaisons prix-qualité |
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| Page | 47-65 | |
| Résumé anglais |
Study of call for tender procedures with regard to price-quality combinations,
by Dominique Bureau, Michel Norotte, Patrick Rey.
Recent experience has given rise to an extension of call for tender procedures linked to changing trends in public service management methods or the redefinition thereof: although they are of very different types, operations such as the sale of television broadcasting channels, transport services to and from Orly or the Channel tunnel are all cases in point. Although it is common practice to leave a certain amount of leeway in terms of technical characteristics, theamount of technological leeway given to bidders in these cases seems quite exceptional.
In fact this trend towards the introduction of quality parameters in the competitive allocation of public contracts appears very general and leads for example to preference being given to the call for tenders to the detriment of "adjudications", which only take into account the cost variable.
Thus the value of systematically stating the consequences of grouping price and quality in the same contract offer extends beyond the exceptionnal cases mentioned above. A study of this kind leads to some finely shaded conclusions.
In the first analysis, the procedures in which the bidders offer a combined price-quality package appear preferable, for they afford less opportunity for them to avoid competition as seen by Bertrand.
This reasoning can be proven false in certain contexts, however, for example when the buyer's criteria are vague, or when various calls for tenders of the same type are called for. In this last case, the broader spread of possible gain in the case of combined price-quality offers may create the ideal conditions for collusion between buyers. This collusion is thus brought about purely and simply by the threat of punishment entailed in their strategies, in the absence of any illegal institutional cooperation.
Basically, therefore, the appropriate procedure must be chosen by examining the merits of each case as it arises.
JEL: 132-431 Source : Éditeur (via Persée) |
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| Article en ligne | http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/ecop_0249-4744_1988_num_85_4_6090 |
