| Titre | L'héritage et l'impôt | |
|---|---|---|
| Auteur | Philippe Trainar, Didier Maillard | |
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Revue | Economie et prévision |
| Numéro | no 100-101, 1991/4-5 | |
| Rubrique / Thématique | Héritage Fiscalité |
|
| Page | 161-175 | |
| Résumé anglais |
Inheritance and Taxes,
by Didier Maillard, Philippe Trainar.
The main issue discussed in this paper is the following paradox: inheritance tax, which is often described as the ideal tax, is only paid by a small portion of taxpayers and the fact that it has been in existence for such a long time should have meant that it be accepted by all. This is not the case, however; it only provides a small tax revenue. This paper scans the results of the economic analysis of inheritance tax, touching upon its efficiency as well as how it can contribute to reducing inequalities. For the analysis, the determining role of whether or not a legacy is voluntary or involuntary in nature, of the intra- or interdy nastic framework, and whether or not the behaviour is characteristic of a particular social class, is underlined. Outside the context of neo-Ricardian hypotheses, according to which it can be considered to be neutral, inheritance tax creates distortions and losses in terms of welfare, and can result in increasing the quantity of untaxed assets. It should not be defined in the Utopian terms of an ideal tax - it should be part of a tax system which is hybrid by its very nature. The paper shows that it is perfectly justifiable, as long as tax rates are not too high, which would generate serious economic distortions and tax evasion, and be no guarantee that inequality will be alleviated. Source : Éditeur (via Persée) |
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| Article en ligne | http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/ecop_0249-4744_1991_num_100_4_5261 |
