| Titre | Le rôle de la délégation dans une relation d'agence | |
|---|---|---|
| Auteur | J. David Pérez-Castrillo, Inès Macho-Stadler | |
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Revue | Economie et prévision |
| Numéro | no 102-103, 1992/1-2 Micro-économie appliquée | |
| Rubrique / Thématique | Micro-économie appliquée |
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| Page | 67-77 | |
| Résumé anglais |
The Role of Representation in an Agency Model,
by Inès Macho-Stadler, J. David Pérez-Castrillo.
This paper analyses two power of agency models in which a principal appoints an agent for a non-observable, productive effort. The difficulty is that the principal also must accomplish an effort which cannot be checked up on either in the area of checking or production, where the agent's interest is at stake. It is profitable for the principal to delegate this task to another agent, thereby separating his objectives from the incentives to his own effort. Our conclusions concern the most appropriate hierarchical structure in an organization on the basis of the characteristics on which our model focuses. Source : Éditeur (via Persée) |
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| Article en ligne | http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/ecop_0249-4744_1992_num_102_1_5276 |
