| Titre | Effort et contrats : quelques enseignements concernant le marché du travail | |
|---|---|---|
| Auteur | André Zylberberg | |
 |
Revue | Economie et prévision |
| Numéro | no 113-114, 1994/2-3 Études du marché du travail | |
| Rubrique / Thématique | I. Contrat, chômage |
|
| Page | 1-20 | |
| Résumé anglais |
Efforts and Contracts: Some Information on the Labour Market,
by André Zylberberg.
When certain variables are unable to be checked by a court, contracts need to be implicit and self-enforcing. This article uses a simple model to analyze how such contracts enable a better understanding of the appearance of certain characteristics in the functioning of the labour market, which would not appear to be explicable using a purely competitive model. Some of the main characteristics studied by the article are a wage contract's optimal form, the remuneration profile over the life cycle, the existence of internal markets, and promotion systems. Source : Éditeur (via Persée) |
|
| Article en ligne | http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/ecop_0249-4744_1994_num_113_2_5664 |
