| Titre | Salaire d'efficience et coopération entre insiders et outsiders | |
|---|---|---|
| Auteur | Muriel Pucci | |
 |
Revue | Economie et prévision |
| Numéro | no 113-114, 1994/2-3 Études du marché du travail | |
| Rubrique / Thématique | I. Contrat, chômage |
|
| Page | 21-37 | |
| Résumé anglais |
The Efficiency Wage and Co-operation between Insiders and Outsiders,
by Muriel Pucci.
This article proposes a new basis for the efficiency ratio, drawing on the distinction between employees (insiders) and applicants (outsiders). It shows that firms should offer wage profiles that rise with seniority in order to encourage insiders, who have acquired specific skills, to train new employees when the individual training effort cannot be satisfactorily observed. A study is made of the conditions under which in-house training with an efficiency wage is chosen by the firm, presuming that the firm may opt for the alternative of external employee training or even use solely unskilled labour. Source : Éditeur (via Persée) |
|
| Article en ligne | http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/ecop_0249-4744_1994_num_113_2_5665 |
