| Titre | La réglementation hospitalière : tarification par pathologie ou achat de soins ? | |
|---|---|---|
| Auteur | Florence Naegelen, Michel Mougeot | |
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Revue | Economie et prévision |
| Numéro | no 129-130, 1997/3-4 Nouvelles approches micro-économiques de la santé | |
| Rubrique / Thématique | Nouvelles approches micro-économiques de la santé Les enjeux de la régulation |
|
| Page | 207-220 | |
| Résumé anglais |
Hospital Control: Pathology-Based Charging or Purchase of Care? by Michel Mougeot and Florence Naegelen
Many countries have introduced incentive systems in order to control health spending. Pathology-based charging rests on the logic of competition through comparison, whereas the quasi-markets in which a care purchaser invites tenders from providers are based on a bidding logic. This paper compares the performance of these two methods of organisation in a context of adverse selection and moral hazard where quantity is fixed and quality respected. The conditions for implementing the two systems are analysed when they are identical. It is demonstrated that purchase of care through an invitation to tender with incentive clauses leads to an improvement in social welfare and a drop in the cost of care. Source : Éditeur (via Persée) |
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| Article en ligne | http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/ecop_0249-4744_1997_num_129_3_5874 |
