| Titre | Pacte de stabilité, crédibilité et stabilisation dans l'union monétaire européenne | |
|---|---|---|
| Auteur | Dominique Bureau | |
 |
Revue | Economie et prévision |
| Numéro | no 132-133, 1998/1-2 | |
| Page | 49-57 | |
| Résumé anglais |
The Growth and Stability Pact: Stabilisation, Credibility and the EMU Fiscal Criteria
by Dominique Bureau
The monetary credibility versus regional stabilisation dilemma that underlies discussions about EMU fiscal criteria can be illustrated using a simple model, in which opting for an independent European Central Bank is assumed to solve monetary credibility problems, but the Member States are also assumed to maintain a strong capacity for fiscal stabilisation to cope with demand shocks.
We show how, in this context, the trade-off between anti-inflation credibility and stabilisation after asymmetric shocks is a delicate issue, since the central bank does not have a simple means of curbing fiscal authorities' expansionary bias. As monetary policy is a public good in a certain way, national governments should free ride on it. Our model does not highlight the intrinsic externalities between the Member States' fiscal policies through imports or interest rates. Instead it puts the accent on the externality arising from a single monetary policy. This means we can regard the introduction of mechanisms, such as those called for in the Growth and Stability Pact, as an additional instrument aimed at alleviating the credibility/stabilisation dilemma. This would enable fiscal authorities to remain autonomous, but make them accountable, as long as sanctions are perceived as being relatively automatic. Source : Éditeur (via Persée) |
|
| Article en ligne | http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/ecop_0249-4744_1998_num_132_1_5897 |
