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Titre Théorie des jeux et économie empirique : le cas des données issues d'enchères
Auteur Jean-Jacques Laffont
Mir@bel Revue Economie et prévision
Numéro no 132-133, 1998/1-2
Rubrique / Thématique
Théorie et applications des mécanismes d'enchères
Page 121-137
Résumé anglais Game Theory and Empirical Economics: The Case of Auction Data by Jean- Jacques Laffont The paper is a survey of applied work with auction data. We review the main distribution free predictions of the three major game theoretic models, the identification of their stochastic structure, and their confrontation with data. We study successively, the symmetric common value model, the independent private values model, and the asymmetric value model. Conditional upon being in one of these models, game theoretic restrictions can be tested. A major conclusion is that predictions are highly dependent on the unobservable restrictions on the distributions of charactristics. The paper concludes with a suggestion to develop structural econometrics of auction data with only a few restrictions on these distributions.
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Article en ligne http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/ecop_0249-4744_1998_num_132_1_5904