| Titre | De l'antisélection à la sélection en assurance santé : pour un changement de perspective | |
|---|---|---|
| Auteur | Agnès Couffinhal | |
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Revue | Economie et prévision |
| Numéro | no 142, 2000/1 | |
| Rubrique / Thématique | Comportements stratégiques dans le systèmes de soins |
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| Page | 101-121 | |
| Résumé anglais |
From Adverse Selection to Selection in Health Insurance: for a Change in Perspective
by Agnès Couffinhal
One of the commonly raised arguments to justify government intervention in health insurance is the presence of adverse selection. However, an economic analysis based on the Rothschild and Stiglitz model (1976) shows that insurers can manage to overcome information asymmetry by differentiating contracts. A summary of the main findings of this research highlights the conditions required to empirically check for adverse selection and presents the tests to establish whether it is found on the health insurance markets. At the end of this work, we cannot reject the hypothesis that adverse selection is present on the health insurance markets. However, the phenomenon appears to be fairly minimal. Adverse selection would also seem to be just one of the hindrances to the efficient running of the insurance markets and contract differentiation one of the possible solutions open to the insurer. Risk selection by the insurers themselves is another phenomenon, often confused with adverse selection, which can also undermine market operations. A clarification of the link between adverse selection and selection highlights the need to better incorporate this second phenomenon into an analysis of market functioning. Source : Éditeur (via Persée) |
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| Article en ligne | http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/ecop_0249-4744_2000_num_142_1_5991 |
