Contenu de l'article

Titre Régulation de firmes polluantes en libre-échange : conséquences des asymétries d'information et des groupes de pression
Auteur Marie-Françoise Calmette
Mir@bel Revue Economie et prévision
Numéro no 143-144, 2000/2-3 Economie de l'environnement et des ressources naturelles
Rubrique / Thématique
Environnement et intervention publique
Page 101-116
Résumé anglais Regulation of Polluting Firms in the free Market: Consequences of Asymmetric Information and Pressure Groups by Marie-Françoise Calmette Our object is to analyse the consequences of opening up the borders between two regulated polluting monopolies in the absence of any strategic environment policy. The main question is whether the free market allows a satisfactory reallocation of global output from the most polluting country to the least polluting country or whether, on the contrary, the "size effect" is confirmed. We then assume asymmetric information in each country between the firm and the agency, and we study the effects of this asymmetry on pollution levels. Finally, we bring in the role of pressure groups by supposing that regulation is performed not by a benevolent agency but by a majority representing the interests of certain economic agents.
Source : Éditeur (via Persée)
Article en ligne http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/ecop_0249-4744_2000_num_143_2_6009