| Titre | Temps et rationalité | |
|---|---|---|
| Auteur | Jean-Pierre Dupuy | |
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Revue | Cahiers d'économie politique |
| Numéro | no 24-25, automne 1994-printemps 1995 Quelles hypothèses de rationalité pour la théorie économique? | |
| Page | 69-104 | |
| Résumé anglais |
Several cases of alleged irrational behavior are examined : imitation of others in a situation of uncertainty ; non-rational revision of belief in a case of cognitive dissonance ; sunk cost fallacy ; weakness of the will. A general characterization of this class of behavior is provided : the agent endowing herself with a power over the past and observing herself as from the outside. These two features are shown to characterize the evi- dentialist choice in Common Cause Newcomb Problems, from Fisher's smoking case to Max Weber's paradox. The rationality of evidentialism is nevertheless advocated. It is furthermore shown that the Backwards Induction Paradox is a Newcomb problem. The rationality and possibility of reciprocal exchange in a case of non-credible promise follows. Source : Éditeur (via Persée) |
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| Article en ligne | http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/cep_0154-8344_1994_num_24_1_1166 |
