| Titre | Rationalité stratégique et émergence des normes | |
|---|---|---|
| Auteur | Laurent Cordonnier | |
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Revue | Cahiers d'économie politique |
| Numéro | no 24-25, automne 1994-printemps 1995 Quelles hypothèses de rationalité pour la théorie économique? | |
| Page | 227-244 | |
| Résumé anglais |
Economists apply sometimes Game theory to social norms analysis. In this framework norms are viewed as strategic equilibria in non corporative games.
But instrumental rationality, that is supposed to rule individual action, faces a clear limit relative to the explanation of nom emergence. To Select his best response, everyone would like to be, ideally, the last one ta play, after everyone. In this respect, for someone to comply with the norm, it ought to be the case that everyone yet comply with the norm. In other words, norms may emerge whenever they already exist. . . Those remarks shed light, by contrast, on the fact that norm guided action requiers some autonomy and capability to take initiative on the part of individuals. Source : Éditeur (via Persée) |
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| Article en ligne | http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/cep_0154-8344_1994_num_24_1_1174 |
