| Titre | Cournot avant Nash : grandeur et mites d'un modèle unitaire de la concurrence | |
|---|---|---|
| Auteur | Jean Magnan de Bornier | |
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Revue | Cahiers d'économie politique |
| Numéro | no 37, automne 2000 Qu'a-t-on appris sur la concurrence imparfaite depuis Cournot ? | |
| Rubrique / Thématique | Regards sur l'héritage de Cournot |
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| Page | 101-125 | |
| Résumé anglais |
For a long time, the analysis of the Compatibility of firm strategies with the rules of Competition Law was the Lawyers private domain. It can't be denied, however that the interest some economists have more lately shown in this field, has greatly helped to improve some juridical decisions.The Game Theory for instance has definitely been helpful in the detection of collusive situations, as indeed the Theory of Contestable Markets when dealing with merging projects.dominant positions, and industries newly opened to competition. Similarly the economists have largely contributed to the working out of the new competition law regulations. The latest legal framework concerning vertical agreements for instance, as well as the leading decision of the Commission make clear reference to the Agency and Transaction Coasts theories. Besides, in its appraisal of R&D agreements, the Commission seems to make use of the production theory. Source : Éditeur (via Persée) |
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| Article en ligne | http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/cep_0154-8344_2000_num_37_1_1289 |
