| Titre | Nouvelles figures de la rhétorique : la logique du ressentiment | |
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| Auteur | Marc Angenot | |
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Revue | Questions de communication |
| Numéro | no 12, 2007 Crises rhétoriques, crises démocratiques | |
| Rubrique / Thématique | Dossier. Crises rhétoriques, crises démocratiques |
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| Page | 57-75 | |
| Résumé |
Les manuels définissent classiquement la rhétorique comme « l'art de persuader par le discours ». Cette banale définition pose problème au vu du fait, évident, que les humains argumentent constamment, mais se persuadent peu et rarement les uns les autres. L'auteur développe une réflexion sur les malentendus et dialogues de sourds dans la communication argumentée et propose l'hypothèse de coupures de logiques cognitives divisant l'espace public. Il illustre cette hypothèse en décrivant ce qu'il considère comme une logique argumentative typée, la logique du ressentiment. S'appuyant sur Nietzsche et Max Scheler, il montre cette logique à l'œuvre dans divers secteurs idéologiques d'aujourd'hui non moins que jadis. Source : Éditeur (via OpenEdition Journals) |
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| Résumé anglais |
The classic textbook definition of rhetoric is « the art of persuading through speech ». This simple definition passes only because we do not stop to examine it. We will offer a few basic objections to it. Humans argue constantly, of course, and in all circumstances, but the fact is that they persuade each other rather little and on rare occasions. This is in any case the impression we consistently get in observing everything from political debates to squabbles over housework, to philosophical arguments. What is a knowledge that sets out a defining criterion only to confirm its failure in life's ordinary circumstances? Many other questions come also to mind: why, since we persuade each other so rarely, do humans not get discouraged and persist in arguing? Despite the fact that individuals and groups generally fail in altering the convictions of others, apparently nothing discourages them in continuing to try ; they are thus able to withstand endless arguments (philosophical, religious, political, etc.) that result in failures of persuasion repeated indefinitely. And why these repeated failures? What is wrong with this reasoning that has been put into words, with this exchange of “good reasons”? What is there to learn from a practice so often doomed to failure, but nonetheless endlessly repeated? When people start arguing, it happens very quickly that the adversary not only comes to a different conclusion, but that he reasons badly or does not respect certain implicit rules which make debate possible. The result is that we wind up with the impression -and this leads to the other big question worth pursuing-that when persuasion fails, it is not only because of the differences in which the world is perceived, but because of form, the way of going about it, the way of proceeding and the way of following logical rules. This paper elaborates on a general hypothesis; that of a diversity of logics co-existing in society while being divergent and somewhat unintelligible to one another. Such an idea dates back to Nietzsche and his Zur Genealogie der Moral. By distinguishing between the “masters'” and the “slaves'” moral codes, and by opposing them to one another, Nietzsche attributes to each ways of evaluating and of conceiving the world that are diametrically opposed. “From the outset”, Nietzsche writes, “the slaves' moral code opposes a no to that which is not a part of itself, to that which is “different” from itself, to that which is its “non-ego” and it is this no which is its act of creation”. This “moral code” lives from its own logic, which Nietzsche calls “resentment”. Source : Éditeur (via OpenEdition Journals) |
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| Article en ligne | http://questionsdecommunication.revues.org/2293 |
