| Titre | Counterpartese, counterpartese*, counterpartese D | |
|---|---|---|
| Auteur | Fabrizio Mondadori | |
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Revue | Histoire, Epistémologie, Langage |
| Numéro | vol.5, n°2, 1983 La sémantique logique : Problèmes d'histoire et de méthode | |
| Rubrique / Thématique | La sémantique logique : Problèmes d'histoire et de méthode. Frédéric Nef [Dir.] Articles |
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| Page | 69-94 | |
| Résumé anglais |
Counterpartese, Counterpartese*, Counterpartesen · «Counterpartese, Counterpartese*, CounterparteseD» is a c. ritical examination of some aspects of David Lewis' Counterpart Theory. 1 first briefly discuss the main points of Lewis' theory, and examine, and dismiss, two superficially convincing, but in fact unsatisfactory, objections to it. Then 1 take up the question of how the notion of a counterpart and that of possibility de re are related, and of whether or not Lewis' theory provides a correct interpretation of ordinary modal discourse: my conclusion is that it fails to account for what 1 calI the literal de re status of modality de re, quite independently of whether it is evaluated inside, or outside, the context of realism about possible worlds. 1 discuss, next, a rather intriguing trait of the notion of possibility that realism about possible worlds involves: i. e., that «possible» in «possible world» expresses a relative, and not an absolute, property of a world. 1 show, finally, that, depending on the notion of an essential property it employs, Counterpart Theory can easily accommodate such divergent metaphysical doctrines as indeterminism and superessentialism. Source : Éditeur (via Persée) |
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| Article en ligne | https://www.persee.fr/doc/hel_0750-8069_1983_num_5_2_1162 |
