| Titre | Les conséquences du fédéralisme sur l'élaboration de la politique de la Réserve fédérale | |
|---|---|---|
| Auteur | John T. Woolley | |
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Revue | Revue française d'administration publique |
| Numéro | no 92, 1999/4 L'administration de la monnaie. | |
| Rubrique / Thématique | L'administration de la monnaie |
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| Page | 9 pages | |
| Résumé anglais |
The Consequences of a Fedéral Structure on the Construction of the Policy of the Federal Reserve ; The Federal Reserve has a regional composition formed by twelve district banks and a central council, the council of govemors. Several institutional characteristics contribute to the independence of the Fédéral Reserve, however the four-year mandate of the president of the Reserve expires, quite by chance, at the beginning of the year of the presidential élection, something which is not without conséquence for the relations between the Reserve and those in political power. The Federal Open Market Committee, the principal decision-making body of the Reserve, is made up notably of the presidents of the district banks, often accused of carrying out a strict form of monetary policy. An analysis of the reports of meetings over a limited period allows for a clarification of this judgement. Source : Éditeur (via Persée) |
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| Article en ligne | https://www.persee.fr/doc/rfap_0152-7401_1999_num_92_1_3344 |
