| Titre | Does Analyst Coverage Impede Long-Term Investments? Evidence from Health and Safety Programs | |
|---|---|---|
| Auteur | Alexandre Garel, Christophe Moussu, Steve Ohana, Arthur Petit-Romec | |
 |
Revue | Comptabilité - Contrôle - Audit |
| Numéro | Tome 27, no 2, mai 2021 | |
| Page | 41-73 | |
| Résumé anglais |
This paper studies the linkage between analyst coverage and Health and Safety (H&S) programs, which have started to emerge in U.S. firms to improve employee health and control healthcare expenditures. Given their homogeneity across firms, their well-documented profitability and long-term payoffs, H&S programs provide an interesting setting to revisit the effect of analyst coverage on long-term investments. We find a strong and negative association between analyst coverage and H&S programs. An instrumental variable approach suggests that the effect of analyst coverage is causal. Cross-sectional analysis indicates that the effect of analyst coverage is more pronounced for firms with a high cost of H&S programs relative to earnings, low blockholder ownership or low long-term investor ownership, and with a low distance of realized earnings to analysts' earnings forecasts. Overall, these results lend empirical support to the view that analyst coverage deters long-term investments in H&S programs by exerting pressure on managers to meet short-term earnings forecasts.JEL Classification: G24, G32, G34, M14 Source : Éditeur (via Cairn.info) |
|
| Article en ligne | http://www.cairn.info/article.php?ID_ARTICLE=CCA_272_0041 (accès réservé) |
