| Titre | Réflexions sur le contrôle a priori des entreprises publiques | |
|---|---|---|
| Auteur | Michel Durupty | |
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Revue | Revue française d'administration publique |
| Numéro | no 4, 1977/4 | |
| Rubrique / Thématique | Études |
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| Page | 12 pages | |
| Résumé anglais |
Thoughts on a priori control of public companies
A priori control has two particularly interesting aspects from the vantage point of modem thought : one economic the other managerial. As regards the first, a priori control should enable the State to prompt and promote a genuine public sector policy. However, this control is always implemented, in opposition to the conclusions of the Nora report, by way of a very tight, tentacular watch System which is so much more cumbersome for the autonomy of companies as their public service charges are heavy. The inadequacy of this System to the prompting function it is meant to fulfil is borne out in the competitive sector by the operations of public companies which act practically without any State direction, e.g. Régie Renault and the big nationalized banks which, moreover, pay out practically no profit or dividends to the public authority. As regards the managerial aspect, control implementing procedures are often inefficient as is evidenced by the disorderly development of subsidiaries and partnerships. This phenomenon results from incoherence rather than from a mutually agreed policy, since it produces two conflicting effects : the development of tacit nationalisations and the occurrence of a certain unbalance in the public sector. These deficiencies pinpoint the need for an overall revision of a priori control of public companies. Source : Éditeur (via Persée) |
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| Article en ligne | https://www.persee.fr/doc/rfap_0152-7401_1977_num_4_1_977 |
