| Titre | Objectifs politiques et contraintes institutionnelles dans les décisions de politique monétaire : analyse économétrique du cas français (1973.03-1993.12) . | |
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| Auteur | Christian Aubin, Jean-Dominique Lafay | |
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Revue | Revue économique |
| Numéro | vol. 46, no. 3, 1995 Les défis économiques actuels : les éclairages de la recherche (XLIIè congrès annuel de l'Association française de science économique. Paris - septembre 1994)) | |
| Rubrique / Thématique | Macro-dynamique et équilibre politique |
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| Page | 869-878 | |
| Résumé |
Political goals and institutional constraints in monetary policy making : an empirical application to the french case (1973.03 - 1993.12)
This paper tries to evaluate the weight of political influences in French monetary policy choices for the period preceding the implementation of the independence law for the Central Bank (January 1994). The analysis is based on a positive politico-economic model describing the bargaining process between the government and the Central Bank. Empirical estimates show that, at least for the interest rate instrument, political considerations have significantly influenced monetary policy choices for the period preceding the adhesion to the European Monetary System. Afterwards, institutional constraints have strongly reduced the possibilities for political manipulation. Source : Éditeur (via Persée) |
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| Résumé anglais |
Political goals and institutional constraints in monetary policy making : an empirical application to the french case (1973.03 - 1993.12)
This paper tries to evaluate the weight of political influences in French monetary policy choices for the period preceding the implementation of the independence law for the Central Bank (January 1994). The analysis is based on a positive politico-economic model describing the bargaining process between the government and the Central Bank. Empirical estimates show that, at least for the interest rate instrument, political considerations have significantly influenced monetary policy choices for the period preceding the adhesion to the European Monetary System. Afterwards, institutional constraints have strongly reduced the possibilities for political manipulation. Source : Éditeur (via Persée) |
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| Article en ligne | http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/reco_0035-2764_1995_num_46_3_409700 |
