| Titre | Incomplétude stratégique dans les jeux de marchés compétitifs | |
|---|---|---|
| Auteur | Gaël Giraud | |
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Revue | Revue économique |
| Numéro | vol. 50, no. 3, 1999 Développements récents de l'analyse économique (XLVIIè congrès annuel de l'Association française de science économique - 1998) | |
| Rubrique / Thématique | Jeux et marchés |
|
| Page | 583-592 | |
| Résumé |
Strategic incompleteness in competitive market games
We study the correlated equilibria of competitive strategic market games, i.e., games for which pure Nash equilibria exactly implement the Walrasian equilibria. We show that Arrow-Debreu economies are strategically incomplete, even if markets are complete (in the usual, non-strategic sense). Moreover, public correlated equilibria exactly coincide with sunspot (competitive) equilibria induced by the strategic incompleteness of markets. Finally, it is much more difficult to complete markets in the strategically incomplete case than in the usual GEI model. Source : Éditeur (via Persée) |
|
| Résumé anglais |
Strategic incompleteness in competitive market games
We study the correlated equilibria of competitive strategic market games, i.e., games for which pure Nash equilibria exactly implement the Walrasian equilibria. We show that Arrow-Debreu economies are strategically incomplete, even if markets are complete (in the usual, non-strategic sense). Moreover, public correlated equilibria exactly coincide with sunspot (competitive) equilibria induced by the strategic incompleteness of markets. Finally, it is much more difficult to complete markets in the strategically incomplete case than in the usual GEI model. Source : Éditeur (via Persée) |
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| Article en ligne | http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/reco_0035-2764_1999_num_50_3_410103 |
