Contenu de l'article

Titre Incertitude sur la demande et incitations au partage de l'information dans un duopole
Auteur Florent Venayre
Mir@bel Revue Revue économique
Numéro vol. 50, no. 3, 1999 Développements récents de l'analyse économique (XLVIIè congrès annuel de l'Association française de science économique - 1998)
Rubrique / Thématique
Jeux et marchés
Page 601-610
Résumé Demand uncertainty and incentives to share information in duopoly We study the incentives to share information in a duopoly when firms can suffer from a lack of information about demand. We show that if the risk of suffering from a lack of information is not too high, the information sharing is always mutually profitable for the firms, regardless of the competition or the nature of the goods. Moreover, we show that the informational behavior of the firms depends on two factors: the kind of demand uncertainty and the assumptions made about information.
Source : Éditeur (via Persée)
Résumé anglais Demand uncertainty and incentives to share information in duopoly We study the incentives to share information in a duopoly when firms can suffer from a lack of information about demand. We show that if the risk of suffering from a lack of information is not too high, the information sharing is always mutually profitable for the firms, regardless of the competition or the nature of the goods. Moreover, we show that the informational behavior of the firms depends on two factors: the kind of demand uncertainty and the assumptions made about information.
Source : Éditeur (via Persée)
Article en ligne http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/reco_0035-2764_1999_num_50_3_410105