Contenu du sommaire : 1992/3

National and Community Interests in Commission and Council Decisions Contrary to the impression that the myth of a ‘Eurocracy' impervious to national interests brings to mind, the search for a balance between national and European interests is at the very heart of EC decision making practices. Institutional structures and the EC decision making process are based on dialogue. Practice, based on the Treaties, as interpreted by the Court of Justice in Luxemburg, calls largely for gradualism and proportionality. It seems that the existence of a real EC ‘arbitration fonction' between national and sectoral interests can also be evoked.

At the Center of the European Decision making Process : the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) Formally, the role of COREPER is to prepare Council decisions. In practice, however, COREPER is responsible for attempting to resolve problems and not only to prepare discussions. COREPER members, thus, hold community and national responsibilities. The permanent representatives also play the role of mediators between government and members of parliament, in particular to explain to MEPs the positions of governments that they represent. The increasing divergence in political and administrative cultures, the language problem, difficult to resolve with the progressive enlargement of the EC could lead to the asphyxiation of community procedures unless the EC untertakes substantial structural reforms.

Council Negotiations at Working Party Level Debates within the Council take place on three different levels : working parties, Committee of Permanent Représentatives, and in the Council itself. Discussions at working party level are of considérable importance because agreement on the contents of Commission proposais is reached at this level. This is always in terms of consensus and not of majority decision because the formai adoption of EC decisions takes place at ministerial level.

After 1992 : Can the Commission Manage Europe ? Optimism and enthusiasm, which breathed new life into the EC in the second half of the 1980s, related primarily to an inventive phase of policy making. The challenge of the nineties is to match this with an equally vigorous innovative process to ensure that policies are implemented. In this context, the Commission can contribute to increase the efficiency of European public management through networking.

The Policy making Power of the European Judge and its Limits Is a government by judges possible in the European Community ? The pro-Community activism in the European Court of Justice over the last decade, criticized in certain member States, was based on the inertia of political institutions with regard to integration. This activism is no longer justifiable as the political institutions have found new strength. Initiatives in favor of change should corne from the Court itself. Thus, the ideal role of the European Court of Justice in the 1990s should be characterized by judicial self-restraint.

The European Parliament behind the Stage : Nine Languages and Three Procedures 380,000 translated pages, 245,000 printed pages in the nine Community languages, are the total number of official documents of the European Parliament for 1991. In this context, the management problems inherent to the production of parliamentary documents should be analyzed according to the needs of an institution undergoing a slow but constant development process. These needs have increasingly conditioned management methods, in particular with regard to the presentation and the volume of documents.

Democratie and Legal Deficits : What's New in France ? The development of the EC System has accelerated the loss of influence of national parliament, already favored by the Constitution of 1958. Parallel to this democratie deficit, the European construction has largely resulted in a legal deficit in France. The recent constitutional revision, which attempted to increase parliamentary control over Community decisions and aimed at responding to the democratie deficit, is limited in innovation. Its implementation through more modest provisions could, on the other hand, lead to a reduction in the legal deficit.

The Control of Member States Community Expenses and the Subsidiarity Principle In terms of public finance, the new dynamics set off by the Single Act of 1986, which found its ultimate expression in the Maastricht Treaty, can be seen in the remarkable increase in financial resources mobilized by the Community. In this regard, the précisé application of the subsidiarity principle has concrète conséquences on sharing control over EC structural funds expenses between the Community and the member States, in a context marked by national will to control public finances.

French Public Administration and the European Agenda -Round Table The Single Act has clearly accelerated administrative reform. Although its interministerial coordination System seems to be efficient, french administration needs to improve its skills in negotiation and lobbying. Those concerned hâve emphasized the continuing expansion of the scope of EC affairs, as well as the overlap between administration and politics. Several conclusions can be drawn : inadaptation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs structures, the need to develop civil servant exchanges, general éducation in the context of, and the issues involved in EC negotiations, insufficient knowledge of languages, and the necessity to improve our bottom up action on Commission proposais and top-down in their implémentation.

Is a Stable Federal Balance Possible in Europe ? The effects of economic integration and of German unification seem to have engendered problems, which can be solved only by a much greater degree of political integration and centralization than is compatible with national and cultural diversity and need for autonomy of EC member States. Common decision making procedures which function reasonably well under German federalism could not resolve this dilemma, nor can the institutionalization of the ‘subsidiarity' principle of the Maastricht Treaty. Hence, a dual constitutional order, clearly balancing the legitimate interests of the Community and the fondamental responsibilities of the member States, is necessary.