Contenu du sommaire

Revue Economie et prévision Mir@bel
Numéro no 100-101, 1991/4-5
Texte intégral en ligne Accessible sur l'internet
  • Héritage

    • Introduction - Pierre Morin, André Masson p. 1-9 accès libre
    • Bilan et méthodes
      • Trois vues sur l'héritage : la famille, la propriété, l'Etat - Pierre Pestieau, André Masson, Denis Kessler p. 1-29 accès libre avec résumé en anglais
        Three Points of View on Inheritance: Family, Property and State, by Denis Kessler, André Masson, Pierre Pestieau. This introductory article offers three complementary views on inheritance, in connection with three institutions: the family as a network of intergenerational relationships, the market governed by property rights and the State with its redistribution policies. The first factor shows how important it is to not to consider bequests as a separate entity, but in conjunction with other substitutable or complementary transfers: these transfers, whether private or public, in line of ascent or descent, in cash or in kind, have undergone (and will undergo) a number of changes over time. An attempt is then made to assess the quantitative effect of inheritance on wealth accumulation and inequality: is the bulk of wealth held at a given time due to intergenerational transfers or the result of past savings of existing generations? Is inheritance the major source of the concentration of wealth or the main barrier to social mobility? Lastly, a number of arguments concerning estate taxation and regulation are discussed, confronting liberal and reformist points of view on the subject.
      • Types et modèles d'héritage et leurs implications - Pierre Pestieau, André Masson p. 31-71 accès libre avec résumé en anglais
        Models of Inheritance and Their Implications, by André Masson, Pierre Pestieau. The purpose of this paper is twofold. Firstly, it provides a taxonomy of the principal models of inheritance known to economists, setting forth the usual distinction between intentional and unintentional bequests as well as various types and degrees of altruism. Secondly, it indicates what the main and specific implications of four of the main models can be in terms of redistribution and resource attributions.
      • Tests des modèles d'héritage : un inventaire critique - Pierre Pestieau, André Masson p. 73-92 accès libre avec résumé en anglais
        Tests for Models of Inheritance: A Critical Inventory, by André Masson, Pierre Pestieau. In order to assess the empirical relevance of a number of bequest models to be found in economic literature, this article presents an overview of the predominantly Anglo-Saxon tests conducted on these models over the past twelve years. After a brief account of the data used, eight general tests are considered, making it possible to "reject" some reasons for bequest while accepting others indiscriminately, after which nine specific tests are considered, the purpose of which is to determine more specifically the relevance of one particular form of bequest. Lastly, the significance of the results obtained is examined and the reasons why it is so difficult to draw clear-cut conclusions is discussed: model not fully identified, data shortcomings...
    • Etudes empiriques
      • Que nous enseignent les enquêtes sur les transferts patrimoniaux en France ? - André Masson, Luc Arrondel p. 93-128 accès libre avec résumé en anglais
        What do the Surveys on Property Transfers in France Have to Tell Us? by Luc Arrondel, André Masson. The reasons for bequests and the practices governing them have been, to a large extent, an uncharted area until recent years. To have a rational and coherent idea of the reasons for the transfer choice, a battery of econometric tests were run on the various bequest models found in literature. In this regard, data compiled from two household surveys (the 1975 Crep and the 1986 Insee survey) have proved to be most appropriate because they provide information on both what the household received (or will receive) from parents and what it handed down (or will hand down) to children. The results obtained concern not only distribution but also the amounts involved in different types of transfers (helping out, inter vivos and post mortem), making it possible to single out at least two heterogeneous populations from the "heir" group, ie households who have received or who will most likely be receiving a sizable property transfer, where the bequests are usually intentional and are backward-looking in nature (what is left is commensurate to what is received) and the other group of households where most of the bequests are unintentional and unplanned in nature.
      • Les legs volontaires en France : évaluation et explication - Pierre Pestieau, Sergio Perelman p. 129-136 accès libre avec résumé en anglais
        Planned Bequests in France: Assessment and Determinants, by Sergio Perelman, Pierre Pestieau. The purpose of this paper is to determine the proportion of planned bequests in France on the basis of a survey of the financial assets of 5600 households. These data are then analyzed to determine whether or not they correspond to our preconceived ideas on intentional legacies and whether or not they comply with some of the standard models of inheritance.
      • Successions et héritiers à travers les données fiscales - Anne Laferrère, Luc Arrondel p. 137-159 accès libre avec résumé en anglais
        Bequest and Inheritance from French Fiscal Data, by Luc Arrondel, Anne Laferrère. In this paper, a sample of 3200 estate duty forms filed in 1987 is used for a basis in describing the behaviour of the French regarding bequests and devises. It showed an estimated overall transfer volume of 125 MF transferred by 263,000 individuals, involving one-half of the people who died during the year. The higher the deceased's income bracket, the greater the bequest. With respect to income, bequest elasticity is less than 1 for the bottom 8 deciles of income and greater than 1 for the top two deciles. When sons and daughters are involved, the total amount passed down is higher. There is no substitution effect between material inheritance and human capital as measured by an heir's social category or income (no compensation). On the contrary, the higher the descendant is on the social scale, the more inheritance he receives. Even where the bequest is unequally distributed among siblings (7% of the sample), there is no visible compensation for the less endowed in terms of human capital.
    • Fiscalité
      • L'héritage et l'impôt - Philippe Trainar, Didier Maillard p. 161-175 accès libre avec résumé en anglais
        Inheritance and Taxes, by Didier Maillard, Philippe Trainar. The main issue discussed in this paper is the following paradox: inheritance tax, which is often described as the ideal tax, is only paid by a small portion of taxpayers and the fact that it has been in existence for such a long time should have meant that it be accepted by all. This is not the case, however; it only provides a small tax revenue. This paper scans the results of the economic analysis of inheritance tax, touching upon its efficiency as well as how it can contribute to reducing inequalities. For the analysis, the determining role of whether or not a legacy is voluntary or involuntary in nature, of the intra- or interdy nastic framework, and whether or not the behaviour is characteristic of a particular social class, is underlined. Outside the context of neo-Ricardian hypotheses, according to which it can be considered to be neutral, inheritance tax creates distortions and losses in terms of welfare, and can result in increasing the quantity of untaxed assets. It should not be defined in the Utopian terms of an ideal tax - it should be part of a tax system which is hybrid by its very nature. The paper shows that it is perfectly justifiable, as long as tax rates are not too high, which would generate serious economic distortions and tax evasion, and be no guarantee that inequality will be alleviated.
      • La taxation des héritages et donations : éléments de comparaisons internationales - Anne Laferrère p. 177-188 accès libre avec résumé en anglais
        Inheritance and Gift Taxes: Bases for International Comparisons, by Anne Laferrère. There is a wide range of ways countries handle the transmission of wealth from one generation to the next. The very concept of property can differ as do the rules governing matrimony, children's rights and the freedom to testate. Inheritance taxes can also be different from gift taxes, such differences having to do with history and civil laws. The USA and Great Britain are considered to be different from countries whose legal system is based on Roman law, and rightly so. For the former, freedom is the basis of the system and the inter vivos tax rate is lower than the post mortem one, the more wealthy being more heavily taxed. Even if these taxes only account for a small percentage of the GDP in France, (as is the case everywhere else), heirs are taxed more heavily on an average and the tax rate for gifts and inheritance are the same. A few details are given for Germany and Japan.
      • Entreprise et fiscalité de l'héritage - Jean-Philippe Vincent, Henri Lamotte p. 189-200 accès libre avec résumé en anglais
        Firms and Inheritance Taxes, by Henri Lamotte, Jean-Philippe Vincent. This paper provides an analysis of the economic problems which result when taxing an inheritance that includes a firm whose shares are not quoted on the stock market, involving a special type of asset. French fiscal laws have few provisions for dealing with this particular situation, due to the very nature of firms as entities bound by contracts, the level of human capital involved in the firm, and the difficulty involved in dividing capital and converting it into liquid assets. Because the rates are much higher in France than in other countries, because it is difficult to enforce assessment methods which, in many cases are not very well adapted, and because there are no specific provisions governing the transfer of firms, the taxing of a firm which is not quoted on the stock market at the time of transfer free of charge involves considerable economic cost, even though it is difficult to give exact figures for such cost.
    • Au-delà de la micro-économie de l'héritage
      • Formes d'héritages dans le débat macro-économique contemporain - Pierre Pestieau p. 201-205 accès libre avec résumé en anglais
        Models of Inheritance in the Current Macroeconomic Debate, by Pierre Pestieau. This paper shows how the main types of bequests - unplanned, altruistic, paternalistic and strategic - fit into the debate over the neutrality of macro-economic policies and the dynamic efficiency of competitive markets. The main conclusion is that most types of bequests are more compatible with the Keynesian view of effective macro-economic policy than with the neutrality hypothesis relying on a dynastic setting only made possible by unconstrained altruistic transfers.
      • L'un transmet, l'autre hérite... - Anne Gotman, André Masson p. 207-230 accès libre avec résumé en anglais
        One transfers, another inherits... by Anne Gotman, André Masson. The neoclassical approach of inheritance is totally forward-looking, based on the reasons the saver, as a potential bequeather, transfers property. Family sociology, on the other hand, has a clearly backward-looking view of inheritance, based on the relationship between the heir and his family. It provides a possible missing link in the economic approach chain, ie the individual's relationship with his family background and with the property inherited from his parents. A psycho-sociological analysis of the way real property is inherited, based on semi-guided interviews of a sample of recent inheritors, the question being whether the heir will keep his property or sell it, shows that the decision depends in part on the coming together of two somewhat contradictory systems of logic: a backward-looking 'logic of kinship', where the descendants's choices are governed by the sentimental or symbolic value an article of property may have for him and by what his parents may want and a forward-looking logic based on self-interest, which is purely economic in nature. Only bidimensional, neoclassical rationality, bringing the inner conflict between a forward-looking 'self' and a backward-looking 'self' to bear, can account for the observed choices regarding the appropriation of property.
      • Pratiques successorales et fécondité : l'effet du Code civil - Paul-André Rosental p. 231-238 accès libre avec résumé en anglais
        Inheritance Practices and Fertility: the Effect of the Civil Code, by Paul-André Rosental. The Civil code has often been blamed for having caused a drop in 19th century France's fertility rate. By stipulating that estates had to be divided up equally among heirs rather than leaving fathers free to decide who they wanted to bequeath their property to , it may be responsible for testators' decisions to have less children so as to avoid estate division. Despite their shortcomings, the data gathered by historians over the past twenty years make it possible to conduct an informal test on this hypothesis. Only one-half of France experienced a change in estate law in 1804, which, in this area, had an overall dampening, but complex and unstable effect on fertility. The rate of the drop in fertility depended, in particular, on how much property was owned in each region as well as on a family's influence and ability to convince heirs remembered unfavourably to waive their rights.
  • Résumés - Zusammenfassungen - Summaries - Resúmenes - p. 240-251 accès libre