Contenu du sommaire : L'intégration européenne : nouveaux enjeux

L'intégration européenne : nouveaux enjeux

• Présentation générale - Christophe Deissenberg, Lionel Fontagné p. 1-14
• Un modèle simple de zone monétaire optimale - Luca Antonio Ricci p. 1-19
  ASimple Model of an Optimum Currency Area by Luca Antonio Ricci This paper develops a two-country model to investigate the circumstances under which it is beneficial to participate in a currency area. It captures both the real and monetary arguments suggested by the optimum currency area literature in a simple monetary model of trade with nominal rigidities. The net benefits that one country expects from participation in a currency union increase with: the correlation of real shocks between countries; the degree of international labor mobility; the degree of adjustment provided by a fiscal tool; the difference between the inflationary bias of the domestic authority and the inflationary bias of the authority of the currency union; the variability of real shocks; the variability of foreign monetary shocks; the correlation of monetary shocks between countries. The effect of the degree of openness on the net benefits is ambiguous. This last result contrasts with the usual argument that more open economies are better candidates for a currency area.
• Une nouvelle évaluation empirique des coûts de l'Union monétaire européenne - Jacques Mélitz, Hélène Erkel-Rousse p. 21-39
  A New Empirical Evaluation of the Costs of European Monetary Union by Hélène Erkel-Rousse and Jacques Mélitz This paper presents an evaluation of the costs of European Monetary Union (EMU) using the structural VAR approach. This approach is based on a model identifying structural shocks sustained by the European Union member states and bringing into play a set of long-run constraints in the tradition of those proposed by the pioneering Blanchard and Quah article (1989). We apply this method to all member states for which data are available, i.e. Germany, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Our contribution here is primarily methodological, taking traditional considerations regarding the degree of shock asymmetry among member states a step further. We endeavour in particular to isolate an exchange rate shock and evaluate its short-run impact on prices and volumes for each country studied. In this way, we seek to evaluate the extent of the sacrifice made by any member state that abandons its sovereignty over monetary policy. Similarly, we attempt to isolate a domestic demand shock to measure the possible advantages to member states of having an independent fiscal policy within EMU. The degree of shock asymmetry affecting the member states of a monetary union is obviously one of the questions raised, but is not the only one.
• Asymétries financières et transmission de la politique monétaire en Europe - Benoît Mojon, Virginie Coudert p. 41-60
  Financial Asymmetries and Monetary Policy Transmission by Virginie Coudert and Benoît Mojon In view of an impending single monetary policy in Europe, it is essential to know whether one and the same monetary policy has a similar effect on national economies. Despite the prevalent use of the interest rate as an instrument by the central banks, there are numerous channels via which monetary policy is transmitted to the real sphere. In addition to the IS-LM channel concerning the money supply and interest rates, and the exchange rate channel with its well-known effect on prices and foreign trade, a credit transmission channel has recently been highlighted by numerous studies. Dependency on bank loans by certain categories of players, households and SMEs, introduces a transmission channel when banks adjust their credit supply in line with the tightness of the monetary policy. The relative weight of these different channels, with their potentially contradictory effects, conditions the efficiency of the monetary policy. Yet there are good grounds for believing that these transmission channels can differ from one country to another and even from one period to another in a single country. This is because the institutional organisation of the financial system differs and changes over time.
• Une approche bilatérale des réalignements au sein du Mécanisme de change européen (mars 1979 - décembre 1992) - Marc-Alexandre Sénégas, Jean-Sébastien Pentecôte p. 61-77
  A Bilateral Approach to Realignments in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (March 1979 to December 1992) by Jean-Sébastien Pentecôte and Marc- Alexandre Sénégas In this paper, we present a model for realigning the exchange rate in a bilateral target zone. This modeling forms a bridge between two analytic movements: target zones and balance of payments crises. We use this theoretical framework to construct a Tobit model to study realignments in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) from March 1979 to December 1992. We examine the question of whether these realignments can be regarded as resulting from a decision-making rule shared by the founder members of the ERM and whether any long-run trends can be discerned in their nature and activation for the period studied. We also evaluate the suitability of European monetary policies.
• Degré de flexibilité des marchés du travail, ajustement à des chocs asymétriques et union monétaire européenne - Hélène Erkel-Rousse p. 79-100
  Labour Market Flexibility, Adjustment to Asymmetric Shocks and European Monetary Union by Hélène Erkel-Rousse In 1961, Mundell posited that regions would have no major problems adjusting to monetary union provided that the shocks they sustained were not very asymmetric and their labour markets were sufficiently flexible. The European Union does not appear to perfectly satisfy these two conditions and the member countries could consequently have problems adjusting to monetary union. However, Mundell's claim should not be taken at face value. First of all, labour market flexibility is just one adjustment element among others. Secondly, the importance accorded to the extent of shock asymmetry is moderated by the fact that the manipulation of exchange rates is not as easy and beneficial as Mundell suggests.
• Emploi et négociations salariales dans une union monétaire ouverte - Hubert Kempf, Pierre Cahuc p. 101-114
  Employment and Wage Bargaining in an Open Monetary Union by Pierre Cahuc and Hubert Kempf This paper studies the effect of alternative wage bargaining procedures, differing by level of centralisation and by time scale, in two countries where wages are negotiated for two periods in an open monetary union. It shows that the best solution for employment depends on the nature of externalities among the Union's countries and even on the extent of foreign trade and the extent of national production differentiation.
• Une étude comparative des comportements salariaux en Allemagne, en France et aux Pays-Bas - Pierre Malgrange, Rahim Loufir p. 115-129
  A Comparative Study of Wage Patterns in Germany, France and the Netherlands by Rahim Loufir and Pierre Malgrange This paper makes a descriptive and econometric comparison of changes in wage equations using quarterly data in Germany, the Netherlands and France. The aim here is to identify specific national features and any convergence in recent years. The recursive methods used (Kalman filter) reveal no significant structural shifts.
• Politiques de redistribution décentralisées et concurrence sociale - Yvon Rocaboy p. 131-143
  Decentralized Redistributive Policies and Social Competition by Yvon Rocaboy The purpose of the paper is to study the possibility of decentralising the redistributive income function. This question is examined in the light of microeconomic fiscal competition theory. We suppose that the redistributive function is assigned to local authorities belonging to a common labour pool in which labour is perfectly mobile. The local authorities can then compete to alter the distribution of labour using their redistributive policy. Thiscompetition is called "social competition"." We show that this kind of competition is rarely Pareto efficient. This conclusion argues in favour of the creation of a "central bureau of redistribution" responsible for this function at the highest government level.
• Impact de l'annonce de la modalité de fixation des taux de conversion des monnaies européennes - Bronka Rzepkowski p. 145-159
  European Currencies Exchange Rates Conversion Rules: Impact of a Prior Announcement by Bronka Rzepkowski Conversion rates vis-à-vis the euro will be known only on the first January 1999. This uncertainty on the levels of final parities may be the source of instalibity during the interim period. Such a risk of tensions can be limited a pre-announcement. The impact of three different modalities for setting bilateral conversion rates is examined in two steps : firstly, foreign exchange and interest rates adjustments at the time of the announcement ; secondly, the dynamics of the currency rates during the interim period. Simulations of exchange rate paths show that annoucing a precise rate (central rate) or an average rule would result in similar levels of volatility. However, announcing a target band would entail at least twice more volatility.
• Le potentiel de croissance du commerce des pays d'Europe centrale et orientale avec la France et ses principaux partenaires - Frédérique Festoc p. 161-181
  Potential Growth in Central and East European Countries' Trade with France and its Leading Partners by Frédérique Festoc In this paper, we propose a study of the growth in trade between the European Union and the CEECs since the start of the transition. Our study focuses on the CEECs' leading EU partners and examines the breakdown of this trade by sector. We then endeavour to determine the growth potential for trade between the EU and the CEECs using gravitation models to measure the effects CEEC trade deregulation. We thus show that the European Union has rapidly become the leading trading partner for Central and East European Countries. Moreover, the results of our estimation show that the EU is likely to remain in this position. Lastly, we address the question of direct foreign investment flows.