Contenu du sommaire : Keynes : économie et philosophie

In this paper we study the construction of Keynes' theory, conceived as a structure composed by three general and basic models, which are deduced ones from the others. We show that Say's law as criticized by Keynes can be formalized by means of a « recursive supply » model. Keynes' criticism leads to a different model, a « non-walrasian and general interdepedence » one, which does not allow to criticize the adjustement to a full employment equilibrium. It is used by Keynes as a basic model from which, in a third stage, he obtains the keynesian model, defined as the model which admits at least one involuntary unemployment equilibrium with flexibility of wages and prices. We conclude that the construction of Keynes' theory is logically coherent and we show the limitations of his theoretical « heresy ».

Keynes' s reading of Ricardo deals with the relations between three theories : the theory of value and distribution, the macroeconomic theory of the level of aggregate output and employment, and monetary theory. Keynes bears on Ricardo to separate the theory of value and macroeconomics, even if he blames him for having « repudiated » any macroeconomic theory. Two questions are central to his evaluation of the classical author : the neutrality of money and the influence of the quantity of money on the rate of interest. The neutrality of money is for Keynes the corollary of Say's Law, and the reasons why he rejects it, from the drafts to the final text of General Theory, are connected with the emergence of the concept of unemployment equilibrium. Keynes' s analysis of the Ricardian theory of the rate of interest shows that the debate on the real effects of a change in the quantity of money is led without any reference to the Quantity Theory. This may explain why Keynes felt consistently in sympathy with some Ricardian positions on the organization of a monetary system (the gold exchange standard), which are independent of the Quantity Theory. All in all, the attitude of Keynes towards Ricardo appears far more favourable than is usually believed.

The purpose of this article is to show that there is a certain amount of ambiguities in the effective demand as determined by Keynes in the third chapter of The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money as well as in the reasons he put forward to justify why this latter « becomes reality ». These ambiguities are all the more awkward since they have damaging consequences on the proposals of economic policy which Keynes advocated in order to increase the level of employment. We try to level off some of these ambiguities and to account for them.

The keynesian theory of interest rate is a theory of the long term rate. It is inferred that the banking system, especialy the central bank, is able to take interest rate's risks. In A Treatise on Money Keynes thinks that central bank must do it so as to check crisis. This idea leads to a rupture with the ricardian money supply analysis but since it has been forgotten.

An important financial and real instability has been generated by the emergence of new types of liquidity behaviours which are connected with financial deregulation. The liquidity preference of J. M. Keynes constitutes the theoretical base of such a point of view. Nevertheless it is necessary to reconsider this notion. In the present paper we first show that this concept has to be considered as a theory of the influence of anticipated asset prices on financing availability. We argue secondly that the precaution motive is then very important. Comparing the role of banks and financial markets in liquidity dynamics, we can then propose an explanation of economic instability which is financial and endogenous. We show that this requires to consider that both the quantity of money and some interest rates are endogenous.

In the continuing debate over Keynes' s political philosophy, Skidelsky has argued that Moore's mixed goods create a dilemma which troubled Keynes and gave his views on social reform distinctly conservative rather than radical tendencies. This paper argues that Skidelsky' s 'mixed goods dilemma' is a fiction. It does not exist in the thought of either Moore or

Right from 1904-6 Keynes was interested in the problems of moral dilemmas which are typical of Greek tragedy. His constant attention to the incommensurability and incomparability of magnitudes (probability and economic magnitudes such as real income, real capital and general price level) derives from this early interest in dilemmas and his concept of uncertainty is connected with rational dilemmas and tragic choices. So, in Keynes, incommensurability and uncertainty are connected with Greek tragedy. Keynes deals with the incommensurability of reasons which are at the ground of probable judgement in his A Treatise on Probability : rational dilemmas arise when there is conflict between incommensurable, opposite and heterogeneous reasons which cannot be weighed down one against the others on a common balance. The dilemmas of the umbrella in A Treatise on Probability, of Buridan's ass in Keynes' s letter to Townshend in 1939, of the two Queens Victoria and Elizabeth in The General Theory are some of the examples to which Keynes refers in his writings. These dilemmas characterise situations of indecision, of irreducible conflict, that is of uncertainty.

This paper outlines the theory of knowledge John Maynard Keynes had developed in his writings. It sheds a light on a different understanding of his central notions like intuition, individual judgment, convention and logic, which is compatible with his view of uncertainty. The reconsideration of his philosophy rejects current attempts to anchor his theory of knowledge against infinite regresses of reason. The movement from categories of truth to categories of knowledge underlines the relativity of the Cambridge Philosophy, of idealisms as well as of empiricism, he already had presented in his philosophical papers. Keynes transformed orthodox categories, which enabled him to analyse economic decision- making in the light of ignorance and uncertainty.

Whether and to what extent Keynes should be considered both a liberal and an individualist is a rather complex question, and one which this paper proposes to disentangle by analyzing Keynes' understanding of Mandeville, whose positions on these two issues were rather ambiguous, as well. Through a comparison of Keynes' reading of the Fable of the Bees with those of N. Rosenberg, F. Hayek and L. Dumont, it is shown that Mandeville' s and Keynes' positions are much more alike than is generally admitted. Furthermore, this similarity invites us to redefine such categories as « individualism », « holism », « liberalism » and « interventionism », which clearly are difficult to apply to either of these two authors.

This text is an epistemological study about the construction of Keynes' s General Theory. The question is the following one : what is the point of view and what is the end Keynes follows when constituing an economic system ? The proposed answer is this one : what founds the economic system is an actor - an actor who is external to the economic system- a political actor. This answer is under the inspiration of the philosophical pragmatism -Peirce in particular- and is opposed to the hobbesian constructivism that one would find with Walras 'works.

According to Keynes, politics should aim at three different targets : economic efficiency, social justice and individual liberty. The first part of the paper analyses the meaning of each target and their combination. Economic efficiency is related to utilitarianism. Keynes is considered as utilitarian because he accepted the two following ideas : 1) the good is related to pleasures and utility, even if it cannot be strictly defined by these two words - 2) an action is right when it increases the happiness of the community. Besides, the second point, the principle of utility, insures that resources shall be efficiently used. Social justice bears on the reduction of unequalities. Unequalities are acceptable only if they contribute to economic development and to the improvement of the whole population. Finally, economic liberties appear as a cause of efficiency as well as a component of personal liberties. The three targets have different degrees of priority. As long as the stage of abundancy is not reached, efficiency comes first, liberty second and social justice third. Full-employment matters, evidently, but is considered more as instrumental for the three preceeding goals rather than a goal in itself. The second part deal with means. In The End of Laisser-Faire, Keynes defines the sphere of intervention of the State in terms of the collective goods. The list of the Agenda of the State may be found in other texts. After 1930 they include « moderate planning », a concept which fits in Keynes' general scheme of « liberal socialism ». In the long run, Keynes believed that « a somewhat comprehensive socialization of investment » and the « euthanasia of the rentier » - which refer to a much more radical socialism - would become unevitable.