Contenu du sommaire
Revue | Cahiers d'économie politique |
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Numéro | no 35, automne 1999 |
Texte intégral en ligne | Accessible sur l'internet |
- Von Neuman-Morgenstern, Nash et Arrow-Debreu : théories des jeux et équilibre général - Sylvain Sorin p. 7-17 The purpose of this note is to make more precise from an historical point of view the connection between game theory and general equilibrium theory. In fact, behind similar terminology and mathematical tools, quite different approaches are used by von Neumann- Morgenstern, Nash and Arrow-Debreu. In particular the equilibrium concept has a very different interpretation in both fields.
- Rigidités microéconomiques, flexibilité macroéconomique. L'émergence d'une macro-économie de la spécificité et de l'irréversibilité - Xavier Galiègue p. 19-36 When using specific assets, the optimal reaction of a production unit to exogeneous shocks is highly non-linear. As a consequence, macroeconomic variables have to be build up by aggregating individual reactions. Asset specificity influences also the factors of production, which have to share the quasi-rent obtained by their collaboration. The working of the market depresss the price of the non specific, flexible factor, in order to reward the specific factor. Investment is depressed and excessive destruction occurs, while the cyclical response of a rigid factor economy is more elastic than that of a flexible factor one.
- Nature et mesure du capital dans la théorie du capital productif de Böhm-Bawerk - Jacques-Laurent Ravix p. 37-61 This paper aims at studying Bôhm-Bawerk's theory of the measurement of productive capital in the light of his realist conception of economic methodology, as opposed to Menger's more conventionalist view. This empirical viewpoint is interpreted as the central methodological topic of the controversy opposing Böhm-Bawerk to J.B. Clark, and leads to a specific analysis of the measurement of capital as a bundle of heterogeneous productive goods.
- Évolution, individualisme et auto-organisation chez Hayek - David.W Versailles p. 63-88 Hayek defines evolution and spontaneous order as twins ideas. Criticizing his cultural evolutionism is ordinary limited to explain Hayek adopted a wholist methodology in order to advocate in favor of the political aspects of classical liberalism and spontaneous order. This research explains the bias is more subtle : the historicist tension in favor of spontaneous order introduces a constraint for individualism. The Hayekian program deals with the relationship between structure and evolution, considered both as an explanation of individual behavior and as an explanation of the existence of a specific set of (social) rules. The later issue raises a tension against the individual subjectivity, but this flaw cannot be drawn against the individual methodology itself. Removing the prescriptive advocacy for self-organized systems provides us with a consistent framework centered on the individual cognition. Unfortunately for Hayek, ones who adopt it, turns out to be Popperians.
Edition : Joseph Alois Schumpeter, Dos Wesen des Geldes
Présentation
- L'hypothèse de J.A. Schumpeter : la monnaie comme comptabilité sociale - Odile Lakomski p. 91-103
Traduction
Notes bibliographiques
- Stéphane Longuet, Hayek et l'école autrichienne, 1998 - Gilles Dostaler p. 127-130
- Michel Aglietta et André Orléan (éd.), La monnaie souveraine, 1998 - Louis Baslé p. 131-142