Contenu du sommaire : De Dreyfus à Verdun

Between 1906 and 1914, the French military justice was “dying”, under strong internal and external criticisms related to the consequences of the Dreyfus affair and to the army republicanization. Yet, it did not initiate major reform in peacetime. The reform did well happen, but in wartime, in april 1916, precisely during the massive and murderous fightings in Verdun. This article aims to analyse this evolution defying civilian and military expectations : why a large scale reform was impossible in the early 1900's, when it had numerous supporters ? And why did it take place at the height of the war, a context which imposed, even in the most progressists' view, a justice of exception ?

Between the beginning of the Twentieth Century and the outbreak of the First World War, appeared a reflexion on the transformation of the French disciplinary model predominant since the pre-Revolutionary period. It is possible to observe how, from 1901, a new interior regulation – a set of rules organizing daily life inside regiments – became a key question for those who tried to promote a modern approach of authority based on initiative and confidence. In spite of fierce resistances at the highest levels of Command, the new regulation promulgated in May 1910 appeared in accordance with the “esprit nouveau” of Republican essence. Therefore it was systematically misrepresented until the eve of the Great War, as it was regarded as too dangerous in an institution sweeped by a strong comeback of authoritarianism.

The trench warfare appearing on all European fronts in 1914 and 1915 is a striking reality for the contemporary imagination. Making of the French Military Engineers Corp a tool to investigate the battlefield representations before and after the outbreak of the war, this article focuses on the military war anticipation of the early 1900's and on the genesis of the french entrenched front between 1914 and the battle of Verdun (1916). The author argues that the structuring conceptions of temporary fortification and permanent fortification are enlightening on the intellectual construction of the Great War battlefields. The sometimes divergent anticipation of french military engineers sketches new paces on the “offensive to excess” period and shed light on long term evolutions through 1914, notably the specialization of military tasks.

This paper focuses on the medical and sanitary contribution to the theoretical frame of French military thought during the decade before World War I. Two major issues are then debated among the military medical planning experts. On the one hand, the medical process of selecting soldiers in the universal conscription system according to the law adopted in 1905. On the other hand, the organisation of health services in modern warfare as teached by lessons of the Russo-Japanese conflict. In 1914, the first months of the war resulted in a famous “health disaster” and the medical dogma of military hygiene appeared strongly challenged. Nevertheless, this breaking off of the hygienist thought has to be understood in the long-term preparation of the military tool. In that way, the sanitary shift of 1915-1916 was operated in line with the idea of preserving the human capital, an idea forged by the health ideal of the nation under arms which had underlain the view of military hygiene since the beginning of the 20th century.

This article argues that the conventional view of the First World War as an historical event taking place only between 1914 and 1918 obscures important aspects of the conflict, particularly when one considers the place of the French colonial empire in the war effort. From the perspective of colonial politics and ideas about race, citizenship, and soldiering, the period between 1906 and 1916 is crucial for understanding “Greater France” in the Great War.

This contribution addresses the relationship of Marcel Proust to the Great War, which broke out when La recherche du temps perdu was published. The physical distance between the writer and the war is better known than his actual interest for military issues and strategy. The latter led him to grasp the global event and to give it a singular echo in his work, questionning not only the facts, perceived and designed at distance by Proust, but challenging also the historic military narrative in itself.

In this conclusion, The author examines the writing of a history both intellectual and military. Concerning the period adressed in this issue of Mil neuf cent, the battle of Verdun could be conceived as an “intellectual moment”, beyond its usual military dimension.

The document is an excerpt of a parliamentary report written by Maurice Bertaux (1852-1911) on behalf of the Army Commission. The report deals with the Senate Bill which would result in the reduction of the conscription from three to two years in 1905. Examining a wide range of political, social and historical issues on the army-nation link, the text stresses the need to consider conscription in a Republican and egalitarian perspective, for the good of citizens and of the army but also to cope with the wars to come.