Contenu du sommaire : Sémantique et stéréotype, sous la direction de Olga Galatanu et Jean-Michel Gouvard

Paradox in argumentative semantics. This paper aims at defining paradox as a mere linguistical notion, indépendant of any cognitive or sociological notion (in particular, « paradox » is distinguished from belief opposite to usually accepted opinions). This definition is given in the framework of the theory of « argumentation in language » , as recently reformulated : the paper second part presents the argumentative notions necessary to define (part 3) « paradox » in this framework. Lastly, the notion is used to characterize sequences of two connected sentences, and lexical words.

Linguistical properties of paradox : paradox and negation. The previous paper has defined a mere linguistical notion of paradox. But this notion does not represent the meaning of the word paradox of the ordinary language : and so it must be justified. This is the purpose of this paper. It shows that the words, sentences and sequences to which the linguistical definition of paradox applies have peculiar properties : for instance the negation effect on them is different from the negation effect on the paradoxical expressions.

The semantico-discursive phenomenon of topoï deconstruction-reconstruction in an integrated argumentative semantics. Having as starting point the analysis of semantico-discursive phenomenon, frequent in media discourse, the phenomenon of topoï deconstruction-reconstruction, and in line with the « argumentation in language theory » , this article proposes a description of the lexical meaning suitable to be caracterized as an integrated argumentative semantics which articulates the stereotypes associated to words, in Putnam's meaning, and the « argumentative possibilities » associated to each element of these stereotypes. An analogy with the quantum states of particles would allow to represent the « argumentative possibilities » of words' meaning as topical clouds, carriers of systems of beliefs . The article aims to show the incidences of this semantic approach on the analysis of discursive mechanisms.

The Proverbs : a very special type of names. The goal of this article is to show that, contrary to Michaux's proposals (1995 and 1996), the proverbs could not constitute personal judgements. The difficulty represented by the data called for invalidate the classical idea which considers the proverbs collective judgements can be surmonted by taking into account two factors : (i) the name status of proverbs and (ii) the « deproverbialisation » procedure through which the proverb is loosing its name aspect and keeps its phrase aspect only. George Kleiber, The Proverbs : a very special type of names The goal of this article is to show that, contrary to Michaux's proposals (1995 and 1996), the proverbs could not constitute personal judgements. The difficulty represented by the data called for invalidate the classical idea which considers the proverbs collective judgements can be surmonted by taking into account two factors : (i) the name status of proverbs and (ii) the « deproverbialisation » procedure through which the proverb is loosing its name aspect and keeps its phrase aspect only.

French law adages. The aim of this paper is to compare proverbs and adages. First, I present some formal properties they share in common, I argue for a denominative approach of such sentences. Next, I demonstrate that adages show a very specific behavior from a semantical point of view and I try to define the class they belong to.

Proverbs and stereotyped structures. Proverbs are traditionally described either as being a proposition or as being a name. In this paper, 1 shall concentrate on the second definition type and analyse Kleiber's proposal on that matter. Kleiber claims indeed that proverbs can be defined by taking into account the nature of the referential relation in which they enter. In this perspective, Kleiber makes of the referential relation by proverb a referential relation similar to that linking a name to its referent. In this sense, proverbs should be considered in Kleiber's terms as a « metalinguistics » denomination. The first step of my analysis will consist in checking Kleiber's hypothesis by testing the validity of such a nominal conception of the proverb. This investigation will lead to a double conclusion. On the one hand, proverbs exhibit referential specificities that are note shared by names. On the other hand, defining proverbs in purely denominative terms can be shown not to provide a satisfying picture of proverbial semantics. The second step of the analysis shall then consist in introducing the phrasal dimension that characterises propositionalist approaches. The aim will be at that stage to put together the nominal and phrasal traits observed in all proverbial units. The last stage of my analysis will consist in describing an interpretative procedure integrating the specificities of this double proverbial status.

In a series of books and articles, Dan Sperber has developed a cognitive theory that distinguishes between « intuitive » and « reflective » beliefs. It is argued here that a reflective belief necessarily contains (or « induces ») at least one « unanalized » concept. This hypothesis allows for a treatment of reflective beliefs which does not reduce them to a particular variety of ordinary beliefs, while leading to a better account of evocation. Indeed, evocation can now he seen as a central (nonmodular) mechanism, in which the processing of an unanalized concept involves the exploration of the « stereotype » assigned to it. In this perspective, « stereotypes » are set of beliefs located in the central system, and should not be confused with (modular) « prototypes ». Marc Dominicy, Les stereotypes et la contagion des idées In a series of books and articles, Dan Sperber has developed a cognitive theory that distinguishes between « intuitive » and « reflective » beliefs. It is argued here that a reflective belief necessarily contains (or « induces ») at least one « unanalized » concept. This hypothesis allows for a treatment of reflective beliefs which does not reduce them to a particular variety of ordinary beliefs, while leading to a better account of evocation. Indeed, evocation can now he seen as a central (nonmodular) mechanism, in which the processing of an unanalized concept involves the exploration of the « stereotype » assigned to it. In this perspective, « stereotypes » are set of beliefs located in the central system, and should not be confused with (modular) « prototypes ».