Contenu du sommaire

Abstract :
The Russian opposition is examined through Russian leaders' perceptions and their talk about it. How do the members of United Russia legitimate their long-term domination as a “conservative” party? What justifies the polarizing politics around the party in power? As “partisans of the state”, party members decry their opponents' “radical” opinions and claim that only a conservative approach can lead to political stability. Leaving aside the acts of violence and the difficulties with which opposition parties must cope, this “pragmatic” conception of politics based on unanimity casts doubt on the very ideas, fundamental to pluralistic systems, of conflict and competition between different political programs.

This analysis of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation as an opposition party focuses on how the CPRF has used a chameleon-like survival technique to facilitate the regime's political adaptation to the post-Communist framework. The usefulness of the party declined once the political regime became autocratic. The CPRF is not an opposition party in the real sense of this phrase, since it is more a facilitator of regime adaptation. Its future depends, therefore, on the evolution of the Russian political system.

Abstract :
Several observers consider the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia and a Just Russia to be “loyal opposition parties” with the purpose of capturing and neutralizing protest votes. A study of how branches of these parties operate in Tomsk (western Siberia) qualifies this interpretation. In the Russian political system with its tight restrictions on the opposition, the flexible structure of the “franchise model” of organization in these two parties along with their strategy of so-called constructive opposition allows leeway for regional party officials to practice a selective opposition to local authorities.

This analysis of the political opposition in Russia compares its past and contemporary definitions and principles and focuses on the boundary between opposition from within and from outside the system.After a brief look at history, focus shifts to the post-Soviet period so as to shed light on the relations between power-holders and opponents. For this purpose, the social and political situation at the local level is observed in Omsk, where the activities of the regional branch of the Iabloko Party and of its activists have been studied. With respect to legislation, this analysis inquires into the way the opposition can use existing electoral laws. In the realm of politics, the opposition's various actions — the organization of demonstrations, debates and meetings with other opposition forces — are reviewed. To understand the forms of this activism and the methods used by its supporters, events in Omsk during the 2008-2010 period are discussed, as well as the response of the local political police, the aim being to determine the origins and conditions of existence of the opposition and to describe its prospects.

Just after the adoption of the new Russian constitution in 1993, the Kremlin set about engineering a party system for sustaining its monopoly on power. This process, initiated by Boris Yeltsin, was furthered by his successor: Vladimir Putin devoted his two terms as president to reforming the party system so as to block free political competition and keep the opposition from playing an institutional role. The goal of an authoritarian modernization of the country was not achieved by the end of Putin's second term; indeed, it is ever farther away. Once installed as president, Dmitry Medvedev sternly criticized the legacy bequeathed by his predecessor for its chronic backwardness and corruption, its primitive economy dependent on exporting raw materials and its ineffective system of governance. He declared that his presidency would conduct an in-depth modernization of Russia based, for the first time ever, on democratic values and institutions. He failed, however, to recognize that political modernization was a precondition for this. The prospects for the emergence of a genuine political opposition are analyzed through a retrospective analysis of the post-Soviet institutional context.

Abstract :
Several analysts interpret the dealings between Russia and the European Union in relation to energy in geopolitical terms. Such interpretations, grounded on a realistic view of international relations, present Gazprom as both a means of power in the Kremlin's hands and a source of danger to the EU's independence. This very geopolitical conception of a head-on collision between the EU and Russia but partly explains the behavior of the parties to this relationship. Given its international deployment as well as its quest for profits and for the security of its outlets, Gazprom is responding to industrial and economic rationales. Desipte its now undisputed status as a player in international relations, the European Union does not yet exist as a player in the energy field. Owing to its many internal divisions, outside parties have a hard time interpreting its declarations. The European Commission bears a model of “energy integration” that Russia, energy firms and some member states have trouble accepting.

Abstract :
Business clans in the Ukraine have formed around businessmen who combine economic with political activities. They exercise a disproportionate influence over policy-making. Powerful financial and industrial conglomerates have arisen out of the capital accumulated by these clans, and gained strength owing to their insertion in networks of power. These networks,formal and informal, are strategic assets for transactions between businessmen and politicians. Ukrainian politics is to be interpreted in the light of rivalries between these clans, which fund political parties and are involved in an ongoing redistribution of power.