Contenu du sommaire : La Chine : nouvel acteur méditerranéen

Since 2013, China is developing a the very large strategy under the name Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or New Silk Road. It includes the constuction of infrastructures and port positions. This initiative generates questions and discussions. Therefor it is necesserary understand what are the representations, the realities and the myths surrounding the New Silk Road. The Mediterranean sea is also concerned despite its distance because it is at the same time one of the shores of Europan Market and the point of access to most countries of the South shore. Port positions do not make a geopolitical strategy, but the ambitious policy of Beijing can be done with economic tools that are the the Chinese maritime giants.

2018 opened a new era as the Belt and Road Initiative unfolded to conquer the ports of the Mediterranean Sea. Early that year, Marseilles was set to become the second largest Sino-European textile trading center in Europe, with the opening of the Marseille International Fashion Center 68 or MIF68, initiated by a Chinese wholesaler. In fall 2018, the Chinese company Quechen Silicon Chemical confirmed in an agreement with the port of Marseilles-Fos, the construction of its European flagship factory. As Chinese economic interests take roots in Marseilles, one can see how globalization, whether coming from above or below, actually affect the actions of the states that are engaged in economic diplomacy.

China is facing a growing food dependency that has forced the country to review its agricultural policy. Its new strategy is based on stopping the productivity thinking to reduce the environment impact of its agriculture, on a qualitative step of agricultural production and on securing agricultural imports, deemed as necessary. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, China seeks to put in place the international aspect of this new policy. If the Mediterranean rim is not considered as a whole by Chinese diplomacy and economic actors, the countries are targeted according to their agricultural potential and their economic situation. China favors commercial presence and still has an agricultural surplus with the majority of countries bordering the Mediterranean, but is beginning to develop agricultural cooperation that allows it to strengthen its political ties and to improve its image while hoping to reduce tensions in international markets. Conversely, with France, Spain and Italy, China finds a source of supply and know-how that fill part of its need. The second world economy does not neglect any country in this region of the world and tries to take advantage of each of their characteristic to meet its agricultural objectives.

Algeria is emblematic of the inconspicuous redeployment of merchant supply networks in the East and South of the Mediterranean. Following the roads from Algerian marketplaces until Yiwu, allows to better understand their nature and their functioning. This article considers the simultaneous construction of the « Silk roads » at three levels, transnational between Algeria and China and national in a country where consumption increase and retail stores and markets multiply. The transregional level is an intersection of the two other levels that is organized from the anchor points of globalized trading posts and marketplaces located in East Algeria. Comparing these three levels enables us to shed light on the formation of global networks – what we call the route – that are situated at the crossroads of local, regional, national and transnational rationales and arise from arrangements at multiple scales among multiple actors. It is now possible to sketch a chronology of the growth in the marketplaces where Algerian importers have obtained supplies for almost 40 years, thanks to recent research using the accounts of Algerian traders collected during continuous and regular surveys conducted by the two authors in Algeria, Dubai, and China since the early 2000s. These studies identified the places and the construction stages of this (these) transnational route (s?).

In 2016, Morocco became the first African country to abolishvisas for Chinese nationals. This new measure led to a significant growth of the Chinese flows and mobilities towards the country. Since then, the number of tourists has increased steadily and flows have taken diverse forms while their dynamics are less known. These trends take place within the context of the emergence of the New silk roads. Whether coming from the state level emerging from bellow, one can witness the growing influence of China in globalization and on the Chinese international migration. By focusing on how the Chinese migrationsin Morocco has evolved since the abolition of tourist visas for Chinese citizens, we would like to highlight through the migration another aspect of Chinese penetration in the south part of Mediterranean, a region where the new silk roads are shaping new areas for the Chinese diaspora.

This article explores the foundation and evolution of the diplomatic and commercial relations between China and three Maghreb countries (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia). It shows the predominant place of Algeria in the Chinese relations with the Maghreb. It questions the roots of these relationships with multiple interests and puts them in perspective by describing in particular the shift from ideological driven relations to business-driven relations. Chinese presence in the Maghreb is part of its global strategy via mechanisms such as the forums (Forum on China–Africa Cooperation and Sino Arab Cooperation Forum) and projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative, however it is operationalized at the bilateral level.

Relations between the People's Republic of China and Egypt have significantly developed in the 2010s. Building on an already solid foundation, Presidents Xi and al-Sissi sealed an « integral strategic partnership » between their two countries at the end of 2014. This article aims at providing an overview of this rapid evolution and highlights the multiplicity of areas in which it is taking place. It notably sheds some light on cooperation in bilateral and multilateral fields, particularly in the framework of the Belt and road initiative launched by Xi Jinping and its multiple geopolitical dimensions. The article shows how China and Egypt reinforce each other in their search for greater room for maneuver in a world order they want to be less Western-centered and increasingly multi-centered.

Since 1973, Spain has preserved good political relations with China leading to the establishment of a Global Strategic Partnership in 2005. Their economic relations have significantly increased during the 2000's. The two countries have recently promoted stronger ties, but Spain has refused to join China's Belt and Road Initiative. Indeed, despite new economic opportunities brought by China's economic demand and transition, both in bilateral relations and in third markets, greater reciprocity and more balanced relations are required. Hence Spain resorts to the EU to negotiate from a more symmetric position more reciprocal terms for its engagement with China.

Can China make a difference to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict? To address this, the article identifies two main forms of peace: negative (i.e. the absence/removal of violence) and positive (i.e. resolution of a conflict's causes). China's position in relation to these peace models and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict are then considered. Attention is drawn to: China's rising regional presence and concern with regional stability and order; its growing and deepening commercial interests with the conflict parties; its commitment to the Oslo process; its contributions towards dialogue between the two sides; and its lack of engagement with the local dynamics taking place in Israeli and Palestinian politics and civil societies. These factors alongside recent developments suggest that on balance point China envisages a negative peace scenario and so is therefore unlikely to be a significant player in resolving the conflict.

Since 1979, Iran is an Islamic Republic led by the Shi'a clergy which holds most of the power, thus corresponding to the very definition of a theocracy. At the same time, the regime has some elective dimension with a very selective and tightly controlled recourse to citizens' voting. The Islamic Republic also considers itself as a revolutionary state challenging the international order. While reference to religion and revolution is essential in the elaboration of foreign policy for such a system, maintaining the regime and strengthening its security may in some cases require some degree of pragmatism and bending of ideological views. Actually, Iran's foreign policy fluctuates between ideology (religion and revolutionarism) and Realpolitik.

On April 9th, the Israelis confirmed by their vote the radicalization of Benyamin Netanyahou and it's extreme right allies since five years: new basic law aiming at apartheid, evolution from colonization to annexation of the West Bank, legislations restricting freedoms, alliance with populist - even antisemites - forces in Europe and in the world. The worth is to come.