Contenu du sommaire : Les leçons militaires de la guerre du Golfe

Whilst the geopolitical conditions may have changed, the military lessons learned from the Gulf War remain as pertinent as ever. They compel us to consider the need for continual adaptation of our defence structure in order to respond to worldwide developments, including the increasing and many-faceted threats.

The American Way of War led to winning the battle for the liberation of Kuwait, and therefore the war, yet through lack of any long-term strategy it did not lead to lasting peace: a situation which continues today.

In January 1991, coalition air power won against an Iraqi army that was tailored for ground action. The Gulf War therefore demonstrated the strategic value of the third dimension and opened up a new era broadly dominated by the United States, which had learned lessons from the war in Vietnam.

Information was at the heart of the Gulf War with on one hand, the info-centric conduct of operations which profoundly changed the modes of action and on the other, the media—an entirely separate set of players. Digital data is essential, the more so given the ever-present social networks: information has become central to everything.

The Gulf War was the opportunity for Washington to enter the era of ad hoc coalitions and in doing so to impose American standards upon them in terms of command structure and the concept and conduct of operations, never mind the difficulties arising from interoperability issues and lack of dialogue.

The Iraqi defeat was a kick in the teeth for Moscow, since it revealed how far behind Russia had fallen militarily. Russia made efforts to draw lessons from that defeat in order to modernise its defence arrangements. Eight years later, the allied operations in Kosovo spurred recognition by the Russians of their own shortcomings.

The brutal collapse of Iraq was a traumatic experience for Beijing, highlighting the obsolescence of its military system based on the Soviet model, as were the Iraqi forces. China then began fundamental transformation of its forces, from then on copying the principles and equipment of the Americans.

Following General de Gaulle's creation of the nuclear deterrent, a founding principle of the Fifth Republic, the Gulf War marked a change in French defence policy. Thirty years later, the cycle of reform has been completed and it is time to envisage a new phase of the national strategic plan.

The politico-military approach to conduct of operations has been transformed since the end of the Gulf War. The role of CEMA (the Chief of Staff of the armed forces) has been strengthened, as has the organisation of operational command. Furthermore, the forces were professionalised in 1996. The next step could be a presidential security council.

The 1992 reforms profoundly transformed the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces. The organisation of military intelligence underwent complete reform with the creation of the Directorate of military intelligence (Direction du renseignement militaire—DRM) and the Special operations command (Commandement des opérations spéciales—COS). These changes began in 1988 and have been accelerated following lessons learned from the Gulf War.

The Gulf War obliged France to review its position with respect to NATO. The French wish for a more autonomous approach to the defence of Europe was thwarted by both the United States and other European countries with little desire to support projects emanating from Paris, therefore creating growing contradictions between ambition and reality.

The role and place of France have greatly developed since the turning point of the nineteen-nineties, resulting in sidelining despite a number of notable successes in arms sales. That said, current changes, including the relative withdrawal of Washington, could accelerate further transformation and drive Paris towards making new choices.

Operation Daguet (the French Gulf War operation) was a high-intensity operation whose lessons learned proved valuable during the intervention in former Yugoslavia in 1992 even if the modes of action turned out to have limited effectiveness because of political decisions taken at the time. Even today, the lessons learned remain useful.

The Gulf War led to significant changes for the French forces, which had taken note of structural failings. Today, the national command structure has been markedly improved, allowing France to show considerable effectiveness in the conduct of operations.

Force projection has long been a task for French forces, alternating with phases of defence of the home territory. From the mid nineteen-seventies the forces had been building their ability for projection yet without facing any high-intensity commitments which could develop into operational reality.

The war against Iraq clearly revealed shortcomings in French forces despite the quality of their personnel. Formatted by the needs of the Cold War, the forces and services needed fundamental reorganisation and, in particular, professionalisation. Developments took place from the end of the conflict as a result of lessons learned.

The end of the Cold War was concomitant with the Gulf War. Defence budgets suffered reductions in the name of the peace dividend. The consequences for France were abandonment of the existing military programming laws, and the ageing and reduction in levels of equipment.

Shortcomings in French armament were highlighted during the conflict and catch-up programmes were thereafter initiated, albeit through lack of finance some did not come to fruition. Technical gaps have been partly filled, but in such a competitive environment the race is never-ending.

The experience of Operation Daguet (the French Gulf War operation) transformed the army by emphasising the need for officer training on joint manœuvres, building upon excellence and the hardiness of soldiers and at the same time ensuring renewal of capabilities. Today's return of high-intensity operations draws on those decades of experience.

Whilst the Marine Nationale was fully committed during the Gulf War, it nevertheless had the feeling of being sidelined to some extent. As a result it underwent fundamental change, building on lessons learned from the conflict. This modernisation allowed it to recover a major force projection capability, centred on its aircraft carrier.

The Gulf War accelerated changes peculiar to the Air Force which had already begun under the programme Armées 2000. The latter's profound changes to the forces' organisation and functioning were subsequently confirmed by lessons learned during the conflict and by the professionalisation of the forces from 1996.

The Gulf War was an historical event, the importance of which may be viewed in different timescales, depending on the approach taken. Analysis reveals elements both of continuity and rupture which profoundly changed military organisations, as in France, and which should lead us to raise questions on today's conflicts.

Conflict will remain with us in the future. Whilst its form will change as a function of technological progress, which includes artificial intelligence, robotisation and the enhanced soldier, the principles of warfare will not, as long as their aim remains to achieve the submission of the adversary according to the victor's will.

After a period of extensive reductions in defence spending, Belgium has decided to update its strategic vision for 2030 and beyond, and to review the assets needed. The main difficulty will be political, since decisions have to be made on the budget required to redress a much weakened situation in a country that shows little interest in its defence.

Recent controversy over Napoleon and slavery has remained silent regarding the Emperor's will to grant individuals their freedom. He eliminated serfdom in several parts of Europe and forbade the sale of slaves and the slave trade in general, a prelude to the disappearance of the barbarity that was so widespread at the time.