Contenu du sommaire : La théorie économique est-elle utile ?

To know wether it is still useful to produce economic theories in the light of what is commonly called the current « empirical turn » cannot be addressed without asking several questions at the same time. First, what is meant by theoretical knowledge in general and theoretical knowledge in economics in particular; secondly, what form of truth or validation constitutes its quality; finally, who could make use of it, under what circumstances and for what purpose? These are the questions and all what they imply that the seven articles of this issue are dealing with, illustrating the plurality of the conceptions of the labor of the economist and the role of theory, introduced by the following remarks.JEL Classification: A11, B4.

This article proposes to revisit some aspects of the epistemological and methodological debate on economics in the light of a pragmatic description, inspired by the sociology of science, of the way « it works ». More precisely of: i) the way in which economics fits into the political debate and thus manifests its «performative» character and ii) its method of elaboration of models and theories. This double description allows the author some remarks and hypotheses on the unity and diversity of economic discourses, the relevance of the distinction between « schools » and between major « general theories », the difference between models and theories, the imperialism of economics, the contribution of mathematics, the debate instrumentalism – conventionalism and the realism of hypotheses, finally on the interpretation of what is today described as an « experimental » turning point in economics.JEL Classification: B41.

Economic theory is has lost most of its attractiveness amongst academic economists. Multiple reasons may explain that discredit but two seem of special interest: most severe requirements about logical consistency and questions to be solved have contributed to shrink the field of economic theory while a strong desire to confront assumptions with reality have blurred the frontier between economics and social sciences. The remarkable development of quantitative techniques (big data) and the type of questions on the agenda have made empirical economics and empirical sociology almost impossible to distinguish.The neglect of economic theory is more evident for the dominant paradigm than for the dominate one, called monetary analysis by Schumpeter who opposed it to real or value analysis. Illustrated by Steuart in 18th century and Keynes in the 20th century, monetary analysis deals with different questions (viability rather than equilibrium) and resorts to different tools (payment matrices rather than excess demands).JEL Classification: A10, A11, A12, B10, B20.

The aim of this article is to justify the relevance of economic theory for achieving an accurate interpretation of past authors' statements. In the light of the contemporary classical theory, we analyze the Ricardian relationship between the rate of profit and surplus labour in the Principles. In contrast to what is usually assumed, we argue that such relationship is verified independently of the labour theory of value. Ricardo discovers the limits of this theory and never points out that labour values are necessary for relating the rate of profit to surplus labour.JEL Classification: B12, B24, B51, D30.

Since the Second Post-War years, economic theory became more and more predominant, perhaps more than in any past period. Till the years 1970, it took essentially the form of the research program of the theory of general economic equilibrium and its main characteristic was its scientific self-sufficiency: economics had to be built independently from any other social science. This situation changed drastically since the 1980s. New approaches as random and laboratory experiments which contributed to develop the idea that experimental approaches could replace and test the validity of economic theory and favor a more inductive conception of economics; it was also associated to the development and diffusion of big data; it also had to be compared with the birth and the development of another form of interdisciplinary economic analysis refusing the assumption of self-sufficiency and accepting an open methodology including the advances of sociology, philosophy, psychology, history,… even in a complex system context. The purpose of our contribution is to face these new methods and developments and to assess what is remaining today when we consider the issue of the utility of economic theory.JEL Classification: A, B2, B3, B4, B5.

Joan Robinson (1903-1983) is interested in the future capitalism is planning for the world. This theme immediately sets her at odds with the neo-classical economists who sought to create a universal and timeless object of study. The persistence of the neo-classical model despite the major objections to it, especially by Keynes, but also by Robinson's own work regarding the ambiguity of the concept of capital, leads her to question the nature of the activity of the economist. In a 1962 book entitled ‘Economic Philosophy' she states that economic analyses necessarily has a foot in science and a foot in philosophy; it would not exist she argues, without an individual who questions the way of the world because they believe they can influence its course.JEL Classification: B 51, B 52, E 11, E 12.

In their controversial book on “economic negationism”, Cahuc and Zylberberg draw on three arguments: economics became an experimental science, which would bring about an epistemological disruption, which in turn would allow theory to be closer to facts. Even though the main observation is ill-founded (since the great bulk of modern economics does not implement randomized-controlled trials, nor field or lab experiments), the aim of this article is to examine the relevance of the other two arguments. We show that experimental methods fall within mainstream's epistemology. Thus, there would be no revolution, but a simple evolution. Besides, experimental settings are theory-laden and are not devoid of proper technical biases. Data always have to be built and interpreted; the so-called “experimental method” does not change this. Finally, we reflect on the place of facts in modern economics. We observe they inspire new theories by signaling empirical deviations which have to be accounted for. This would hint at a lesser renewal; the theoretical hardcore would be strengthened by making auxiliary theories more compatible with empirical results.JEL Classification: B41, C90.

In this paper, I will raise some objections against Tony Lawson's argument that the distinguishing property of heterodox economics in comparison to orthodox/mainstream economics can be seen in its ontological/realist orientation. Therefore, in order to delineate the possible meaning of the concepts, I will refer to the concepts “mainstream”, “neoclassical”, “orthodox” and “heterodox”. The definition of the terms can either proceed in an intensional or in an extensional manner. While the extensional definitions of the terms must remain rather arbitrary, there can be positive intensional definitions of the terms “mainstream”, “neoclassical” and “orthodox”. But in the case of “heterodox”, there can possibly be no positive intensional definition at all. By opposing this claim, Lawson is trying to give a positive definition methodologically: In a common implicit commitment of heterodoxy's various schools they would all subscribe to an ontological/realist orientation. While Lawson's argument looks promising at first sight in providing an intensional positive definition, it is indeed highly problematic due to his use of the concepts of ontology and realism. I will argue that his use of these concepts, at least in the context of his distinction between heterodoxy and orthodoxy/ the mainstream, is inconsistent and even self-contradictory. With this rather vague use of the concepts ontology and realism his definition of “heterodox” also falls short of consistency.JEL classification: B4.