Contenu du sommaire : Guerre en Ukraine

Russia's war against Ukraine has its roots in a re-reading of history for ideological reasons. The past has certainly been complex and painful for centuries but that does not justify wanting to change history by force.

The conflict which began on 24 February is large in scale and covers the whole range of warfare, from hybrid to guerilla, including the latest generations of high-tech weapons. There is therefore a risk of permanent loss of control and of longer-term continuation of a major, murderous crisis.

Following the shock of 24 February, Ukrainian armed forces have been confronted by a major Russian offensive in which the balance of forces issignificantly in Russia's favour. The capability of the Ukrainians to defend themselves depends on their military assets, yet also on their psychological resilience.

The current war is in the Russian view a matter of national sovereignty rooted in a long history and carried forward by an ideological project, set against a background of the sensitive question of the political relationship to be established between Russian-influenced space and Europe.

Turkey and Ukraine have maintained relations for many years, Ankara seeing Kyiv as counter balancing the influence of Moscow in the Black Sea. Ukraine is thus a client of the Turkish armament industry, notably with the purchase of drones now deployed against Russia.

The operation launched against Ukraine depends principally on powerful ground action, supported by a mechanised armoured corps, giving the aggressor an unequalled force advantage. Russia has a particularly large fleet of modern tanks at its disposal.

Ukraine suffered much of the torment of the Second World War since it was one of the eastern regions in which the confrontation between Nazi Germany and Stalin's USSR was of exceptional violence and intensity, and in which the civil populations went through hell.

Defence matters are not an essential priority in the debate leading up to the presidential election. In the battle between consensus and continuity, projects have often been at variance with budgetary chioces made after the election. Hence the need now for greater realism.

With the approach of the presidential elections, and the associated analysis of past actions, there is satisfaction that the 2019-2025 military programming law has so far been closely followed, which has meant the planned updating of the forces has begun. There nevertheless remains a number of unknowns, notably in the area of cooperation. [The Hôtel de Brienne is the home of the Minister of the armed forces]

Defence matters, though at the heart of the presidential role, have lost their importance in electoral campaigns. Since the beginning of the 21st century the teams of candidates have been less au fait with policies relating to defence than was the case during the period 1970-1980, a time of serious debate.

The defence of France was central to General de Gaulle's construction of the Fifth Republic. His mission of national security remains fundamental: it transcends party politics in order to respond to current geopolitical developments and the crises that attend them.

Commanding an operation like Sentinelle requires different operational approaches from those used on external operations: the aims are different and are subject to a distinct legal framework which itself relates to the running of the state and, moreover, they have a strong and essential inter-ministerial dimension.

War is now hybrid, and aims at influencing citizens through information or disinformation with a view to blurring the perception of reality. Influence, here, means manipulate — hence the need to strengthen our collective resilience in the face of risks linked to the globalisation of information.

Star wars will not be Star Wars, but a matter of confrontation and adversaries' action to prevent use of the space ecosystem which is now essential to military activity. This is why the French space strategy, adopted in 2019, aims at boosting the resilience of our assets, including satellites.

The Strategic Compass projectis a step forward in European recognition of the strategic uncertainty that threatens the security of EU member states. This step augurs well, as long as the 27 can maintain their political will in the long term and can transform it into action on the ground.

It is not only the Americans who consider warfare via the social environment: it isused by other protagonists such as Iran and Hezbollah. The approach covers many fields adding to strategic competition and compelling us to rethink our own modes of action.

Be it officially or unofficially, Russia is back in Africa, acting through the employment of private military companies which allow Moscow to strengthen its interests there - economic ones in particular. These companies are little burdened by constraints and above all respond to the bidding of their Russian sponsors.

We are sad to report the death of General Claude Le Borgne shortly after his 100th birthday. He was one of the pillars of RDN, having made 380 contributuons. Revue Défense Nationale pays tribute to him in its columns.

We are sad to report the death of General Claude Le Borgne shortly after his 100th birthday. He was one of the pillars of RDN, having made 380 contributuons. Revue Défense Nationale pays tribute to him in its columns.

On 26 March 1962, an Army military unit engaged on a maintenance of order operation in the centre of Algiers opened fire, leading to 46 deaths among the crowd and numerous wounded. That tragedy long haunted reflection on the use of military forces on national soil.