Contenu du sommaire : Guerres technologiques et rivalités politiques

The army is on occasion referred to as La Grande Muette—the great dumb (voiceless) one. Current reality has rendered that expression anachronistic, since the Ministry for the Arrmed Forces has for a number of years been committed to a policy of expression and communication, to make the realities of our defence more widely understood. As far as our fellow citizens are concerned, it is a requirement for its legitimacy.

The war in Ukraine might well be called a bastard war in that it is bringing together many different forms of warfare and with them a risk of escalation: inter-state high-intensity conventional warfare, hybrid warfare with cyber operations and manipulation of public opinion, and Moscow's nuclear blackmail.

Space has once again become a competitive field, not only between countries, as in the 1960s, but also with new competitors, including private industry, via New Space and its access through internet. Ambitions are clearly stated and, given the strong competition, we see ever-greater investment.

The geopolitical upsets of recent years, accelerated by the war in Ukraine, are calling into question the position of France. Although France risks losing status internationally, it has assets and advantages which should be strengthened in coming years, especially on an economic level.

Aerospace technologies are markers of power for states that have ambitions for defence. Using a degree of discretion, France has developed exceptional competences through its deterrence programme. This effort should be continued and increased in order to retain our credibility and strategic autonomy.

France's strategic autonomy is one of the pillars of our defence policy, operating within a European perspective. A number of criticisms of armament industries nevertheless constitute a growing difficulty for the financing that is essential to development of the Defense Industrial and Technology Base (DITB).

France has a clear ambition to strengthen its strategic autonomy via a sound Defense Industrial and Technology Base (DITB), in turn supported by coherent programmes. The European dimension is one of the fields of progress which will offer the ability to respond to future challenges. Through the DGA (Directorate General for Armament, the French procurement organisation), France will be a committed participant.

Once the subject of major competition between the United States and the USSR, space has today become a somewhat privileged place for political and technological rivalry between an increasing number of players, both state and private. Their ambitious projects reveal a growing interest for space.

The way drones are piloted has changed the relationship between the crew and the machine by virtue of the lack of physical links between them. It has led to a significant evolution in understanding the mission. Experience of drone use over time has led to improved understanding of a complex and innovative system.

The Blue Homeland doctrine developed by Turkey reveals Ankara's expansionist ambitions. Employing the increasing strength of its military force and acting across a very wide range of modes of action, Turkey is shaking up the Mediterranean regional order.

Everyone has been deluded by Vladimir Putin, in good faith believing in his goodwill. In fact, he has always acted like a former KGB agent, driven by a nationalist and authoritarian ideology and nostalgia for empire, whether Tsarist or Soviet. This wake-up call is both painful and worrying.

After decades of confrontation, the end of the Cold War led to the arrival in Brussels of the first delegations from Eastern countries—from Russia in particular. Curiosity about this opening-up, the visits in particular, attracted considerable media interest at the time—the Russians seeming somewhat like extra-terrestrials.

The war in Ukraine is having numerous consequences in the Mediterranean Basin and the surrounding countries. It raises many concerns, not least of which is the thorny problem of food supply. Countries friendly to Russia are remaining prudent, and all are closely following developments in the conflict.

The war in Ukraine can be read from a geopolitical perspective covering both continents and oceans. The conflict is not simply one between two states: it is part of a far wider picture which involves China, growing to be the biggest competitor of the United States.

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has failed in Ukraine because of limitations—knowingly adopted by its member states—on its ability to act. The organisation, founded in 1975, nevertheless remains relevant and could have a post-conflict role to play as long as certain states, Russia included, continue their support of the OSCE by giving it the means to act.

Initial analysis of tactics employed in the Russia-Ukraine conflict affords much information on the organisation of command and support. There are numerous lessons for the Army to be learned from this feedback: it needs to draw the right conclusions to conduct operations in a symmetrical war.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO found it difficult to adapt to geopolitical developments. Although the events of 11 September 2001 revived the Alliance, it had lost much of its dynamism through lack of American interest. With a shock, the war in Ukraine has redealt the cards.