Contenu du sommaire : L'essence selon Hegel

In Hegel's doctrine of essence there is an important difference between the Encyclopedia Logic and the Science of Logic: namely, form, matter and content are considered at different places. If that logic is supposed to be immanent, however, how can it exist in two different versions? I answer that the two texts do not set out alternative logics but present the same logic in different ways. Yet the Science of Logic has priority over the Encyclopedia, because it explains why form and other determinations of ground, which are absent from that section in the Encyclopedia, are logically necessary.

In Hegel's doctrine of essence there is an important difference between the Encyclopedia Logic and the Science of Logic: namely, form, matter and content are considered at different places. If that logic is supposed to be immanent, however, how can it exist in two different versions? I answer that the two texts do not set out alternative logics but present the same logic in different ways. Yet the Science of Logic has priority over the Encyclopedia, because it explains why form and other determinations of ground, which are absent from that section in the Encyclopedia, are logically necessary.

The concept of form allows us to understand the ontological dimension of Hegel's Logic. However, the process of determination, which is form, is not yet formally described in Objective Logic; this discrepancy produces singular effects. We propose to give a sample of these effects in the Logic of Being, before focusing on the moment of externalization of form, which occurs in diversity ( Verschiedenheit) in the Logic of Essence. There, the relation between form and figure develops itself in a peculiar way, making it possible both to integrate the “formal” logic and to analyze a specific type of objectification: the variable.

We propose to reread the Doctrine of Essence from an epistemological perspective, showing that it deals with the question of the objectivity of knowledge. The three modes of reflection are all ways of addressing the modern problem of knowledge having to justify its objectivity. Hegel will show that the objectivity of knowledge is measured by its ability to think about increasingly concrete forms of objects.

This article attempts to distinguish between the ontological and logical issues at stake in the Hegelian theory of actuality. First, it clarifies how the Science of Logic “coincides” with ontology, or “replaces” it. Second, it analyzes how Hegel presents the Science of Logic as a whole as a logical theory. In the third step, the contribution of the actuality section to the theory of the truth of thought can then be better understood.

Two opposing trends are manifest in current interpretations of Hegelian logic. The first, designated as “ontological,” gives it referential purchase. The second, designated as “epistemological,” emphasizes the reflexive dimension of logical thought; it abandons the question of reference for the self-examination of thought. While the first approach seems more likely to guarantee the objectivity of logical thought, it encourages the adoption of a “rhetoric of passivity,” which seems ill-equipped to explain the movement that animates logic. The article therefore proposes to account for this movement by highlighting the central role that Hegel grants subjectivity in logical thought. It will then become clear that, while there is indeed always someone who is doing the thinking, thinking also requires that this someone could be anyone.

In this essay, I would like to contribute to an correct understanding of Quine's use of the truth predicate in the formulation of logical laws. The issue at stake is central: since “logic chases truth up the tree of grammar” by generalizing over sentences instantiating the same logical structure by means of the truth predicate, to commit a misunderstanding on this point is to render oneself unable to adequately understand the internal relation between logic and truth. The method adopted in this essay consists in correcting some widespread confusions about the relation between logic, truth, and semantic ascent.

“Practical truth,” according to Anscombe, does not merely refer to the capacity of intentional agents to act but to their capacity to act well. As Aristotle put it, it is “truth in accordance with right desire.” Anscombe specifies the point: “Practical truth is the truth brought about in sound deliberation leading to decision and action, and this includes the truth of the description ‘doing well'.” The aim of this paper is to understand the ethical significance of this concept which does not merely address the deliberative structure of intentional action, but the issue of what is a good action, and more precisely what is a good human action: “Practical truth is truth created by action in a sense in which neither branches nor dogs nor children are capable of action.”

We propose a synthetic review of the evolution of Putnam's philosophy of truth. Beyond the apparent paradox of his claimed fidelity to a naturalism that he has nonetheless continuously redefined in depth, our reading focuses on the continuity of Putnam's effort to philosophically articulate the norms that operate within scientific thought, based on a reflection on the reality of representational relations.