Contenu du sommaire : Les armées françaises et les crises du Moyen-Orient, 1973-2003

The 120th anniversary of the Entente Cordiale is the opportunity to highlight the increasing solidity and vitality of the bilateral defence relationship. At a time of threats, and of the war in Ukraine, Paris and London are working together to face the challenges of the future.

The Entente Cordiale between the United Kingdom and France owes much to pragmatism and to the personal relationships between the political and military leaders of the two countries. In the summer of 1914 the Entente was an essential element that permitted effective military cooperation, in particular after Russia had left the Triple Entente.

Historically, France has been a committed diplomatic and military player in the continual reconfiguration of the Middle East. We therefore have to understand the complex history of the region in order to learn lessons that remain relevant today. This essay proposes to shed some light on this need for understanding of a recent past that still has resonance.

From 1973 to 1978, on the instigation of successive Presidents, France increased its diplomatic and military commitment to a region that had become of great importance against the background of the Cold War. Paris made efforts to favour mediation and better balance in order to strengthen international security that had been weakened by the Arab-Israeli conflict and its consequences on the oil and fuel markets.

The Yom Kippur war of October 1973 led to a deep and lasting transformation. Israel's image of invincibility collapsed, and Egypt's renewed military honour permitted dialogue with Tel Aviv. For Europeans, France included, it was a time of marginalisation to the benefit of the United States.

Arms sales and military cooperation with the Middle East in the 1970s were part of the political objectives decided by Paris. Benefiting from oil revenue, countries there were buying huge quantities of equipment in a regional environment made increasingly tense by the Iran-Iraq war.

Throughout the decade of the 1970s, the Marine Nationale progressively redeployed its fleet, putting effort on the Mediterranean — Red Sea — Indian Ocean axis in order to protect essential maritime trade routes. From 1975, this change of direction focused on the reopening of the Suez Canal, and foreshadowed future commitments.

France operated effectively within UNIFIL in 1978-1979: the risks were real, as witnessed by violent clashes and losses. In the absence of a robust UN mandate, the French detachment was partially withdrawn in 1979, and was temporarily restricted to logistic tasking.

The year 1979 was a turning point in which the fall of the Shah of Iran led to the establishment of a theocracy imposed by Ayatollah Khomeini. The same year saw the start of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. These fundamental strategic changes in the Middle East pushed France to take action in Lebanon and around the Arabian Peninsula.

Teheran has developed since 1979 into a major regional player, built upon Islamism and Iranian nationalism. Its openly-declared and violent anti-Western stance nevertheless contradicts the aspirations of a civil society more open to the world, which compel the Ayatollahs to act with a degree of pragmatism.

Amid the confusion in Lebanon the French Navy ( Marine nationale) and the US Navy were committed to greater or lesser effect as the complex political constraints allowed. Though they produced few tangible results, they achieved very close coordination and, concerned for the cohesion of their ships' companies, the admirals of both navies shared a common aim for interoperability.

The consequences of the Iran-Iraq war on sea routes around the Arabian Peninsula led France to deploy the Marine Nationale in the area with notable success. This major effort, in 1987-1988 in particular, allowed French merchant ships to be protected and strategic dialogue with Iran to be re-established.

French military presence in the Middle East has evolved over the last few decades. Its posture, now more rather more submissive than was the intention, is evidence of declining French influence despite the continuing desire of Paris to be a credible intermediary. French forces have also benefited from these commitments in their transformation and operational development.

The very solid Franco-American military cooperation in the Middle East was built upon mutual trust and long experience in common operation, particularly in naval matters. The key to success was in the importance of the political relationship, especially during the Gulf War.

Beginning with the 1991 Gulf War, the French Air Force gained a new theatre of operations which required it to increase its projection capability. It was also the opportunity to work in a US-led coalition and hence to improve the interoperability of our air forces and to contribute to boosting our diplomatic presence.

It is paradoxical that Moscow's increasing aggressiveness towards Paris is adding to the credibility of the French position regarding its unambiguous support for Ukraine. By not excluding any option, President Macron has increased the level of competition, thus compelling Vladimir Putin to acknowledge the strategic role of France in the conflict.

The Army was subjected to many reforms and much restructuring from 1962 onwards in order to adapt to the new strategic requirements and to ever more drastic budgetary constraints. In 1975, General Lagarde, the Army Chief, began an ambitious reform to modernise our forces, which spanned several decades.

Russia, like the USSR before it, is conducting a permanent offensive of disinformation and manipulation of public opinion. Moscow is trying hard to destabilise the collective west through the pressure it is putting on the internet and social media. France is a major target and has already suffered the consequences in Africa.

When Valéry Giscard d'Estaing arrived in the Elysée in 1974, the Army was in a difficult situation: its values had been rejected by a society undergoing profound change and its materiel was widely dilapidated. Furthermore, its management levels were underpaid and ill-considered, and youth was challenging the constraints of national military service.

Haiti is once again being destabilised by internal gang violence and the inability to build a political process to extract the country from crisis. The international community is unsure what to do, though the necessary first step is to re-establish a minimum of safety and security for the population.

Honour is an age-old virtue, frequently associated with the warrior spirit. One cannot be commanded to be a hero: heroism depends on a host of circumstances and the position held. It must be recognised by others as honourable, and not sought after if it is not to be simply vainglorious.

The instability to the east and south of the Mediterranean and the worsening situation in Ukraine together paint a sombre picture, seemingly with worse to come. It is clear that new strategic break-ups are likely, bringing with them as-yet unpredictable consequences that will force us to anticipate and act.