Contenu du sommaire

The optimality of a non specialization within households. A break in becker's theory continuity Microeconomic models imply that a sexual division of labor is optimal within "cooperative" families. This paper questions the assumption that household decisions are made cooperatively. Then, it proposes a non cooperative model to study infra-household allocation of time. Within this model, non specialization can be more and more often optimal when the relative cost of specialization and the divorce probability rise.

Several econometric studies have shown that, at least for some pollutants, the relationship between emissions and income per capita follows an inverted U curve, known as "environmental Kuznets cuve". This paper present a simple microeco-nomic model in which income explain the shape of the emission path. Under some hypothesis, the trade-off between consumption and pollution imply that the pollution path follows three phases. In the first one, the consumers provides any effort in order to reduce the pollution, such an effort is done in the second phase. This effort is just sufficient to limit the rate of pollution growth. When the income per capita is high enough the pollution decrease, this is the third phase. In this paper, we show that the consumer heterogeneity is crucial in order to well characterize the pollution income relationship.

Transition towards a fully-funded system in an endogenous growth model We study the transition from an unfunded to a funded pension system in an endogenous growth overlapping generations model (with positive externality of aggregate capital stock on individual producers). We suppose that workers have different skill levels. We distinguish cases where the initial unfunded system provides either uniform or past wage decreasing replacement rates. In the first case, a saving-fostering subsidy can make both transition generations and future generations better off. In the second case, the shift in saving return may be insufficient to realize a Pareto-improving reform. Then one needs to keep a intragenerational redistribution scheme.

In this work, we built a model of bank-enterprise relationships in an adverse selection situation. The informational problem is resolved by a double device. First, firms choose the number of potential lenders, then banks deduce some information of debtors'quality, therefore, we obtain a semi-separating equilibrium. On the other hand, banks complete the solution of informational problem by using separating contracts where the separation is based on the pair (rate; likelihood of rationing). Then the model permits to link the debt concentration, the credit cost and the credit availability to the firm's risk. So, we show that more risky firms prefer fewer number of potential lenders. On the contrary, the fewer risky firms prefer more potential lenders: they limit the possibility of credit rationing.

Are the balanced budget proposals sensible? The balanced budget proposal which has been done in the United States, and which also appears in the Stability Pact devised for the Monetary Union in Europe, leads, in the long run, to a disappearance of the stock of public debt. We show that the absence of public debt is perhaps not an optimal situation, for a variety of reasons: over accumulation of capital, inefficient fiscal transfers, between generations, insufficient diversification of savings where the return on productive capital is uncertain. We also examine the role of the nature of the tax system in the determination of these results.

The economist's role and status in antitrust cases: lessons from past experience in the US cement industry Economic authors have underlined the deep inroads of economic thinking into competition (EU) and antitrust (US) policies. Analysing the 70s and 80s, some have gone so far as to refer to this phenomenon as a "revolution" (Kwoka & White [1989] ; Dumez [1990]). Prima facie, they cannot be dismissed. The economics vocabulary and concepts, even when used as rhetoric (McCloskey [1994]), has pervaded in competition and antitrust literature. The various economic criteria set forward in guidance or consultative documents such as "greenpapers" in the eu or "guidelines" in the us is another example. Yet a fair deal of renowned microeconomists remain skeptical. They stress that microeconomics develops according to its own academic agenda, increasingly los­ing touch with the practicalities of the markets. The academic analytical tools become more and more complex and do not provide with straight answers. But what could really be said about the status of economics in the antitrust decision making process What can economists claim from their involvement in such matters To tackle these issues some distance with the current debates is necessary Only an historical approach will provide the means to put into perspective the impact of antitrust economic analysis and controversies on the dynamic of markets Also concentrating on particular industry will enable to avoid generalities The paper selects the cement industry as an empirical material The focus is made on two important topics in industrial economics pricing with the basing point system antitrust case which has arisen in the US in the late 30s and along the 40s Supreme Court decision 1948) and industry structure with the antitrust case on vertical integration which has run along the 60s Statement of general policy enforcement Federal Trade Commission 1967]) Classification JEL 031 042 612 634