| Titre | Les conditions favorables aux ententes et leurs variations | |
|---|---|---|
| Auteur | Jacques Le Bourva | |
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Revue | Revue économique |
| Numéro | 1955, no 5 | |
| Page | 717-756 | |
| Résumé anglais |
SUMMARY number of tlie conceptual premises upon which the Theory of the Firm and specially oligopoly theory have long been based have recently been attaöked and recriented On such line this is an appraisal of the causes and extent of collusion and of their variations over time As grounds for collusion worth to be noted at first the interrelation ships among firms positive cross-elasticities and coefficient of interdépen dance) secondly the Joint-Profit-Maximization principle and finally the entry limitation of newcomers into the market This article stand up for the stability of collusion over time It gives as motives the tendency toward product homogeneity going together with an increase of oligopolistic structure the internal organisation of technical innovation and finally because of excess capacity the limi tation of supply market sharing too spartial or technical is an important stabilizing factor of collusion Source : Éditeur (via Persée) |
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| Article en ligne | http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/reco_0035-2764_1955_num_6_5_407136 |
