| Titre | Insertion des jeunes sur le marché du travail et nature du contrat d'embauché : une approche par la théorie des jeux répétés | |
|---|---|---|
| Auteur | Valérie Ulrich, Michel Sollogoub, Thierry Pénard | |
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Revue | Economie et prévision |
| Numéro | no 146, 2000/5 | |
| Page | 73-94 | |
| Résumé anglais |
Integrating Young People into the Labour Market and the Type of Employment Contract: a
Repeated Game Theory Approach by Thierry Pénard, Michel Sollogoub and Valérie Ulrich
This paper compares the implications of signing a short-term contract as opposed to a long-term contract on the young, low-skilled labour market. Employers reap a number of advantages from opting for a short-term rather than a long-term contract. We use a repeated game theory framework to study the effect of the employment contract type (long-term or short-term) on the possibilities for co-operation between employees and their employers. Co-operation proves to be highly sensitive to the terms of employment contract termination. For example, an employer can use short-term contracts as a threat and hence an incentive to make employees work harder. This threat is less credible in the case of a long-term contract. Employers should therefore be more inclined to co-operate and pay a higher wage to offset the reduced effectiveness of reprisals under a long-term contract. We test this prediction based on data taken f Source : Éditeur (via Persée) |
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| Article en ligne | http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/ecop_0249-4744_2000_num_146_5_6129 |
